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I. INTRODUCTION
Questions about the appropriate degree and nature of local au-
tonomy and of administrative decentralization arise in responding to
many kinds of environmental problems. This comparative study will
investigate these questions in the context of United States, French,
and Italian air pollution control efforts. European Economic Com-
munity' air pollution law will also be considered in order to present a
complete picture of air pollution law in France and Italy, which are
Community member states. The implications of air pollution's wide
ranging geographic impact and the mobility of economic activity in
the face of localized air pollution control efforts will receive particular
attention.
This comparative investigation is not concerned with what coun-
try has the cleanest air or the "best" air pollution control program.
Any such judgment would require subjective assessments, such as the
priority of air pollution relative to other social concerns, and technical
* Ph.D European University Institute, JD Harvard Law School, DEA Universite de
Lyon, Dott. di giur. Universita di Bologna. Presently associate, O'Melveny & Myers. The
author thanks Professor Terence Daintith, Yves Meny and Richard Stewart for their encour-
agement and counsel.
1. The European Economic Community is composed of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and the United Kingdom, all of which have adhered to the Treaty of Rome, as
amended.
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evaluations, such as the effect of geography and climate on air quality
or the character of national economic activity and its effect on air
pollution emissions.
This investigation is concerned with how the structure of deci-
sionmaking, specifically the distribution of responsibilities between
central and local levels of government, affects the substance of air pol-
lution control. Although the varying distribution of responsibilities
between local and central authorities in each of the systems studied
permits comparative hypotheses to be tested, unfortunately for pur-
poses of investigation, each system relies primarily on command and
control regulation2 rather than on economic incentive strategies. 3
Under an economic incentive approach the amount of allowable pol-
lution would be determined by issuing a fixed quantity of tradable
pollution permits or by fixing a pollution charge sufficient to induce
the desired level of pollution abatement. In addition to its promotion
of economic efficiency by inducing realization of the lowest cost abate-
ments, its promoters further argue that it explicitly focuses attention
on the total amount of pollution to be allowed, a variable overlooked
in technology based permitting schemes typical of command and con-
trol regulation. 4
This is an example of how different pollution control strategies
may lead to different substantive results by changing the kinds of
questions presented for decision. Although the United States, France,
and Italy have not yet employed economic incentive approaches in air
pollution control to any significant degree, the analysis which follows
does show how the distribution of responsibilities between central and
local levels of government may affect the substance of air pollution
control efforts. The illustration of the importance of the decision
structure is likely to interest those who would advocate fine tuning of
the existing command and control regulation as well as to those who
would replace it by an economic incentive approach.
The focus on the distribution of power and responsibilities be-
tween central and local units of government limits the investigation in
yet another way. It necessarily overlooks the importance of basic
political and cultural differences as factors in understanding a particu-
2. Command and control regulation refers to express governmental determination of
permissible conduct by means of permits, licenses, concessions, and the like.
3. Economic incentive strategies are advocated by Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming En-
vironmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).
4. Id.
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lar country's air pollution control efforts. Many examples of these
differences exist.
For example, in the United States two political parties alternate
in power. In Italy, where coalition governments of essentially the
same four or five parties are the rule, many ministries remain consist-
ently in the hands of particular parties. 5 Consequently, reorganizing
the public bureaucracy in Italy is harder than in the United States
because of the greater stake of the political parties in the status quo.
6
Finer differences also distinguish the systems. For example, in
the civil law tradition of continental Europe, bureaucrats are much
more likely to have a legal background than in the common law tradi-
tion of the United States. 7 Even between France and Italy there are
important differences of administrative culture. France, for example,
has the tradition of elite administrative corps and a passive judiciary,8
while Italy has an activist career judiciary and no tradition of grand
corps.
9
Focusing on the distribution of responsibilities between central
and local governmental levels to the exclusion of other issues may
diminish the accuracy of the comparative observations to be made.
However, the narrowness of focus is necessary to draw policy conclu-
sions which would otherwise be lost among the many national
idiosyncrasies.
II. STRUCTURAL CONCERNS
Local and central levels of government may perceive air pollu-
tion problems in different ways.' 0 The physical impact of pollution,
the economic costs and benefits of control, the administrative burden
5. For contemporary analysis of Italian political parties and patronage, see E. Scalfari,
Riflessioni sul voto del 12 maggio, LA REPUBBLICA, May 19-20, 1985, at 1.
6. Cf. B. DENTE, GOVERNARE LA FRAMMENTAZIONE: STATO, REGIONI ED ENTI LO-
CALI IN ITALIA 104 (1985).
7. J. ABERBACH, R. PUTNAM, & B. ROCKMAN, BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS IN
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 51 (1981).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 136-151.
9. Del Duca, I giudice italiano e statunitense: il contrasto tra strategie in sostituzione e
strategie di controllo della Pubblica Amministrazione, UNITA DELLA GIURISDIZIONE E TUTELA
DELL'AMBIENTE 374 (1986).
10. See generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) (reviewing
issues relevant to central and local responsibilities). What Professor Stewart calls spillover
problems include political externality effects.
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of control, and the value of clean air are among the factors which may
be assessed differently.
At a basic physical level, air pollution produced in one locality,
as in the case of photochemical smog and acid rain,' 1 may have its
principal effects elsewhere. Any one locality may make only a margi-
nal contribution to the global problem. Therefore, localities may find
little interest in individually instituting control measures to abate such
air pollution. Alternatively, severe and visible local problems, such as
Los Angeles' photochemical smog or Turin's traditional mix of winter
smoke and fog, may induce local authorities to take action which cen-
tral authorities would not.
Central and local levels of government will also be influenced
differently by the ability of pollution sources to relocate. To the ex-
tent that the increased costs of pollution control may induce polluters
to relocate to areas without control, local authorities face substan-
tially larger costs to pollution control. The implicit threat that ex-
isting activity and future growth may locate in other areas is a
disincentive to local control efforts.12 Of course, a central government
may be subject to some economic pressures to which a local govern-
ment is immune. It may be that a nationalized utility or a major pri-
vate corporation could exert pressures more successfully at the central
level than on some local governments.
A polluter's lack of need to consider the effects of pollution as a
production cost is the classic example of an economic externality.' 3 It
will be convenient to refer collectively to the exportation of pollution,
the slight marginal impact of pollution from any one locality, and the
pressure of industrial relocation for the least common denominator
solution as political externality effects. In each case the external im-
pact of pollution damage, the external incidence of the benefits of con-
trol, or the export of economic benefits linked to pollution in the face
11. See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, 1982 SuPP. 96-
98 (Supp. 1982); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, EN-
VIRONMENTAL POLICIES FOR THE 1980's 29-34 (1980); Wetstone & Rosencranz, Trans-
boundary Air Pollution: The Search for an International Response, 8 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV.
89 (1984); Wetstone, Acid Rain: The International Perspective, 11 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 31, 31-
33 (1983); ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, LTD., ACID RAIN: A REVIEW OF THE PHENOME-
NON IN THE EEC AND EUROPE (1983); Photochemical Smog in CONTRIBUTION OF VOLATILE
ORGANIC COMPOUNDS (OECD, 1982).
12. See M. CRENSON, THE UNPOLITICS OF AIR POLLUTION: A STUDY OF NONDECI-
SIONMAKING IN THE CITIES 76-82 (1971).
13. For a thoughtful exposition of how conventional economic analysis applies to envi-
ronmental problems, see D. PIERCE, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (1976).
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of isolated control efforts is a powerful incentive for local inertia. As
long as decision-making power remains exclusively local, the full ben-
efits of pollution control will tend to remain external to local decision
makers' analysis, hence the term "political externality."
In addition to these considerations of political externality, ad-
ministrative economies and diseconomies of scale also play a role in
the appropriate distribution of central and local responsibilities.1
4
Various kinds of knowledge may be critical to pollution control ef-
forts. Common to all kinds of pollution control is an understanding
of the nature and sources of pollution emissions and of their effects on
health and the environment. The substantial economies of scale in
research on these issues argue for a centralized role in gathering and
disseminating information and in setting standards. However, other
kinds of information may not so readily suggest centralization. For
example, the awarding of permits to individual industrial pollution
sources may require evaluation of local and facility specific factors.
Centralization of these functions may impose substantial bureaucratic
costs.
It is difficult to generalize about issues such as these because not
only is it difficult to calculate costs in the abstract, but also because in
different circumstances varying combinations of market regulatory
and of command and control strategies may be desired. Although
both kinds of strategy require a basic understanding of pollution, its
effects and its sources, the kinds of information each requires about
individual polluters will vary, and accordingly may alter the econo-
mies and diseconomies of scale in information gathering and
dissemination.
The choice of pollution control strategy and the distribution of
pollution control responsibilities among levels of government may
also affect the kinds of explicit political choices to be made with re-
gard to pollution control. For example, one approach might be to
centrally establish ambient safety standards and then implement them
by a permitting system. Such an approach may overlook the possibili-
ties for cost effective reductions in pollution which could be achieved
by focusing control efforts on inexpensively abated pollution and on
pollution to which large populations are exposed. By the same token,
an approach under which the permitted quantity of emissions was
centrally determined and then achieved by instituting a pollution tax
14. See supra note 10; see also Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. oF L. & ECON. 1
(1960); Zerbe, The Problem of Social Cost in Retrospect, 2 REs. L. & EON. 83, 84 (1980).
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would possibly allow some populations to be exposed to unhealthful
quantities of pollutants.
The tension between equal protection and cost effective pollution
control illustrates the significance of the level of government at which
pollution control decisions are made. The problem can be simply
stated. If air quality were equal everywhere, improving air quality in
a city would yield greater benefits in terms of collective exposure than
would improving air quality in a less populated rural area. 15 But, it
might be asked, does not everyone have the same right to healthy
air? 16
Resolution of this conundrum is not a technical problem.
Rather, it is exquisitely political. 17 On one hand, moving responsibil-
ity to the most local level possible may permit the kinds of debate,
reciprocal persuasion, and compromise which tend to legitimize col-
lective decisions of conflicts between individual rights and collective
interests. On the other hand, local decision-making may disregard
impacts of locally generated pollution outside the local area or attach
excessive weight to economic consequences of pollution control.
As expressed in United States political theories, the ideal is that
political units be:
(1) large enough to encompass a heterogeneous mixture of people
and problems so as to avoid the tyranny of the majority (Madison's
15. Harrison & Nichols, Benefit-Based Flexibility in Environmental Regulation,
HARVARD ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CENTER, DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES E-
83-06 (Apr. 1983), make the case for varying regional air pollution standards. See also Haigh,
Harrison, & Nichols, Benefit-cost Analysis of Environmental Regulation: Case Studies of Haz-
ardous Air Pollutants, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 433 (1984) (case study of three toxic air
pollutants).
16. See Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental, Safety, and Health Regula-
tions: Ethical and Philosophical Considerations, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL REGULATIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS AND METHODS 137-54 (D. Swartzman, R. Liroff,
& K. Croke, eds. 1982).
Judge (now Justice) Corasaniti writes:
Nessun organo di collettivita, neppure di quella generale e del resto neppure l'intera
collettivita generale con unanimita di voti potrebbe validamente disporre per qualsiasi
motivo di pubblico interesse della vita o della salute di un uomo, o di un gruppo mi-
nore. (No collective body, even of the general collective, nor even the entire collectiv-
ity by unanimous vote, could for any reason of public interest dispose of the life or
health of a person or of a lesser group.) (unless otherwise noted, all translations are
by the author)
Judgment of Oct. 6, 1979, Corte Cass., Italy, 102 Foro Italiano [Foro It. 1] 2302, 2306 (1979).
To keep the argument sharp, questions relative to esthetic values or the value of preserv-
ing the environment in its natural state are not considered.
17. See O'Hare, The Country Mouse and the City Mouse, 4 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT
556, 556-59 (1983).
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defense of the American Republic against Montesquieu's criticism
of large republics is based on this principle) and (2) small enough
to ensure that most of the problems [are] of concern to most
people. ' 8
The degree to which American states, French departments or regions,
or Italian regions fit this description is unclear, and it is accordingly
difficult to speak in absolute terms about the ideal level of government
responsibility. Concerns of equal protection, administrative efficiency
and political externality may pull in conflicting directions. The analy-
sis of the United States, France, and Italy will argue that these vary-
ing concerns are best accommodated when central and local
responsibilities are divided so as to permit local and central govern-
ments to compete with each other.
The value of local autonomy and the diseconomies of scale in
central regulation of numerous dissimilar sources of pollution suggest
that localities (departments, regions or states) should have primary
responsibility for control of air pollution arising from their territory.
However, the political externalities associated with air pollution con-
trol argue that local discretion should be limited by centrally deter-
mined minimum standards, and central authorities ought to be
capable of impelling local action.
This article argues that central action is necessary to overcome
the local inertia likely to exist as a result of the political externalities
associated with air pollution control. Nevertheless, to the extent fea-
sible, localities should bear administrative responsibility for imple-
menting any central air pollution control policies, and they should
have the political autonomy to decide the best method to accomplish
such implementation. This arrangement will lessen the imposition on
local autonomy and the administrative diseconomies associated with
centralization. Moreover, notwithstanding the need for a strong cen-
tral role to overcome local inertia, it is important that centrally im-
posed standards be only minimum standards, allowing localities to
exercise some discretion and autonomy.
Local pollution problems sometimes lead local governments to
act when central authorities do not. Examples include Turin's regula-
tion of space heating' 9 and California's imposition of vehicle emission
18. E. HAEFELE, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGE-
MENT 86-87 (1973).
19. Faced with inadequate national controls, Torino, a city of about 1.2 million, issued a
municipal ordinance to control air pollution caused by space heating. See B. DENTE, P.
KNOEPFEL, R. LEWANSKI, S. MANNOZZI & S. Tozzi, IL CONTROLLO DELL'INQUINAMENTO
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controls. 20 These local actions may trigger general central action.
For example, in the case of California's emission controls, concerns
about the burden of state regulations relating to interstate commerce
differing from state to state contributed to provoking federal regula-
tion.21 Also, although central authorities are usually able to resist
pressure from sources of pollution lobbying for less stringent stan-
dards, local authorities may sometimes be able to insist more effec-
tively on stricter standards. For example, as previously noted, a
locality may well be capable of imposing stricter standards on a na-
tionalized electric utility than central authorities.
The review of the regulatory schemes of the United States,
France, and Italy which follows is intended to show the need for bal-
ance in allocating central and local responsibilities. Balance does not,
however, mean weakness or passivity at either level. This article ar-
gues that competition between local and central levels together with a
strong central power to effectively mandate minimum (not minimal)
levels of local action will produce the best results for air pollution
control.
III. UNITED STATES
A. Federal Intervention Conditioned State Action
1. A brief history
United States cities have long attempted to control air pollu-
tion.22 For example, Chicago adopted a smoke ordinance in 1881.23
Efforts such as this were inadequate because municipalities could not
bring sufficient resources to bear on the problem. 24 The states were
ATMOSFERICO IN ITALIA: ANALISI DI UNA POLITICA REGOLATIVA (1984) [hereinafter B.
DENTE & P. KNOEPFEL].
20. 42 U.S.C. § 7543 permits California to do so as long as the state standards meet
certain minimum requirements. Section 7543(a) sets forth a general prohibition against States
(or their political subdivisions) adopting or enforcing an emissions control standard in conflict
with the federal standards. However, section 7543(b) then provides that the prohibition will be
waived as to those states which first adopted standards before March 30, 1966 and when those
states' standards are, inter alia, at least as stringent as the federal standards.
21. J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA
AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 1940-1975 169-76
(1977).
22. D. CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS 1-9 (1981).
23. CHICAGO, ILL., LAWS AND ORDINANCES, p. V, art. XXVII, § 1451(2016), and art.
XXIX, § 1650-2(2253-5) (1890), cited in D. CURRIE, supra note 22, at 1-8.
24. See, e.g., Currie, Enforcement Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 70 NW. U.L. R. 389
(1975).
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slow to follow because air pollution was seen as a strictly local prob-
lem. For example, Illinois did not create a state air pollution control
agency until 1963.25
In 1955 Congress enacted the first federal legislation on air pollu-
tion 26 which provided for federal research grants and information dis-
semination. More expansive and drawing on local resources, the
Clean Air Act of 196327 provided federal grants for state enforce-
ment,28 permitted interstate compacts29 (although none were ever es-
tablished), and created an extremely cumbersome enforcement
procedure known as an abatement conference. 30 In an abatement
conference, state, local, and federal officials were to confer with pol-
luters to reach a settlement.3' The only incentive for agreement under
this provision was the remote possibility of a federal law suit.32 Only
eleven such conferences were held.
33
Subsequent legislation continued to be procedurally unworkable
or insufficiently stringent. The Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control
Act of 1965 authorized national standards for cars. 34 The Air Quality
Act of 196735 provided for establishment of federal air quality criteria
to be adopted by the states.36 The 1967 Act permitted a federal en-
forcement suit after violation of air quality standards for 180 days and
if a Governor requested the suit or if there was an interstate effect.
Neither state nor federal authorities took much action under these
awkward procedures.
37
25. Ill. Air Pollution Control Act, 1963 Ill. Laws 3191 (repealed 1976).
26. Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 159, 69 Stat. 322. For a chronicle of United States
federal air pollution control legislation from 1955 to 1974, see J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, THE
POLITICS OF POLLUTION 44-57 (2d ed. 1975).
27. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
28. Id. § 4.
29. Id. § 2.
30. Id. § 5.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 5(f).
33. J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, supra note 26 at 57.
34. Pub. L. No. 89-272, § 202, 79 Stat. 992, 992-93 (1965) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7521 (1982)). Section 202 provided for administrative promulgation of national
standards.
35. Pub L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-28
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
36. Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 107, 81 Stat. 485, 490-91 (1967) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7408-10 (1982)).
37. See generally D. CURRIE, supra note 22, §§ 1-9 - 1-21.
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Only with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 197038 was a seri-
ous commitment made to action at the federal level. That Act, also
for the first time, gave the federal government the means to compel
significant state action. 39
2. Wisconsin: a case study
Legislation in the state of Wisconsin illustrates how control ef-
forts evolved as air pollution became more widespread and complex/'4
The increasingly apparent inadequacy of local efforts was not rectified
until the federal government intervened to require the establishment
of significant state level bureaucracy to address the issue. Federal in-
tervention was provoked by increasing public awareness of air pollu-
tion, which in turn was partly due to prior local efforts to resolve the
problem.4'
Milwaukee, Wisconsin's major city, has been the state's leader in
air pollution control. As early as 1846 a municipal ordinance permit-
ted city officials to remove hazards to the inhabitants' health and con-
venience.42 From the late 1800's through the 1920's city efforts
focused on fines for emissions of dense black smoke.43 From 1926 to
1946, various city agencies, which primarily regulated building safety,
were responsible for air pollution control.44
Until the late forties, air pollution was perceived as a problem of
visible particulate emissions from smokestacks. Indeed, a 1909 state
legislature resolution requested the city council of the state capital to
abate "the soft-coal nuisance" which was dirtying the new, white
marble capitol.45 In the beginning this emphasis on local esthetic ef-
fects may have been realistic, however, as urbanization and industrial-
ization increased, effective regulatory action required a more
sophisticated understanding of air pollution.
38. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
642 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 58-83.
40. J. LAITos, A LEGAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROLS (1980).
41. Id. at 307-10.
42. Id. at 69.
43. Id. at 75-81.
44. Id. at 92-103.
45. The resolution provided in relevant part: "Whereas the beauty of the edifice must be
seriously impaired soon by the condition of the atmosphere which has become immeasurably
worse ... the legislature requests and expects the common council of Madison to effect an
abatement of the soft-coal nuisance in this city." 1909 Wis. LAWS, reprinted in J. LAITOS,
supra note 40, at 119.
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State courts began to decide nuisance actions against polluters
after World War 11.46 However, such individual litigation could not
effectively manage air pollution. The suits involved too few of the
actual polluters. Furthermore, proof by private parties was difficult,
and bringing suit expensive. Judicial interventions were isolated
events lacking any systematic coherence, and the judges did not have
adequate technical expertise.
From 1947 to 1973, state law delegated the responsibility for air
pollution control to the County of Milwaukee. 47 The County insti-
tuted a permitting program and regulated fuel quality. 4 Although
the County's effort was constructive, it did not go much beyond regu-
lating particulate emissions. The County did not have sufficient bu-
reaucratic resources to explore its pollution problem more deeply.
The State Board of Health had nominal responsibility for air pol-
lution beginning in 1937, but never acted. 49 According to a thirty
year veteran of the Board, its officials thought air pollution was solely
a smoke problem suited for local control.50
Federal legislation in 1967 provided for federal regulation of air
pollution control in the absence of state action. 51 In response Wiscon-
sin passed its own Clean Air Act 52 administered by the new Depart-
ment of Natural Resources. 53 The air pollution branch was staffed by
only two people until 1970. 54 In 1970 the federal Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) was created, 55 and the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1970 required EPA approval of state air pollution control
plans.56 The state then prepared a comprehensive plan consistent
with federal guidelines, which the EPA subsequently approved. 57
46. J. Laitos, The Social and Economic Roots of Judge-Made Air Pollution Policy in Wis-
consin, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 465, 479 (1974-1975).
47. LAITOS, supra note 40, at 168-214.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 276.
50. Id. at 276-77.
51. Clean Air Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108, 81 Stat. 485, 491-97.
52. Clean Air Act, 1967 Wis. Laws 83. As subsequently amended, Wisconsin air pollu-
tion law is codified at Wis. STAT. § 144.30-.32 (1981).
53. Created in 1967, by Wis. STAT. § 15.34 (1981). See J. LAITos, supra note 40, at 307.
54. J. LArros, supra note 40, at 327.
55. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No.
98-80, § 2(a)(2), (b)(2), (c)(2)(C) (1983), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. app. at 502 (1983), 42 U.S.C.
app. at 1102 (Supp. III 1985), 84 Stat. 2086 (1970), and in 97 Stat. 485, 486 (1985). See also J.
DAVIES & B. DAVIES, supra note 26, at 107-14.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982).
57. The Wisconsin plan, officially submitted on January 14, 1972, was initially approved
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The lack of understanding of air pollution was certainly one fac-
tor behind the inadequacy of local efforts in Wisconsin. The lopsided
balance of diffuse benefits of air pollution control as against very dis-
crete incidence of control costs diminished local political initiative to
raise the issue of air pollution. Also, as a single state, Wisconsin had
substantial disincentive to act in isolation for fear of directing eco-
nomic activity to other states. Nonetheless, efforts like Wisconsin's
played a role in pushing the air pollution problem into the public con-
sciousness and in creating the consensus on which federal legislation
depended.
B. Contemporary Federal Controls
The introductory sections of the Clean Air Act currently in
force, 58 recognize the need for central leadership by providing that
"prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary
responsibility of States and local governments; and... Federal finan-
cial assistance and leadership is essential for the development of coop-
erative Federal, State, regional, and local programs to prevent and
control air pollution." 59 Consistent with these introductory passages,
states have the primary responsibility for awarding permits to air pol-
lution sources within federally established constraints.
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, United States central bureau-
cracy makes three kinds of decisions which local decision makers can-
not adequately handle. First, it sets New Source Performance
Standards. Second, central bureaucracy sets ambient air quality stan-
dards. Third, it monitors compliance with them through its power to
review and disapprove State Implementation Plans. 6°
by the EPA on May 31, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 10842, 10902-10903. Additional parts were ap-
proved on September 10, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 32606.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7401-62 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For a comprehensive treatise on the
Clean Air Act, see D. CURRIE, supra note 22. After analyzing the many problems with the
Act, Currie concludes that it "is extremely untidy, but it works." Id. at § 10-5. For discussion
of some reforms to simplify the permitting process, see Del Duca, The Clean Air Act: A Realis-
tic Assessment of Cost-Effectiveness, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 184 (1981). On the Reagan
administration's environmental policy, see Peterson (former head of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality under Presidents Nixon and Ford), Laissez-Faire Landscape, NEW YORK
TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 31, 1982 at 27.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3), (4).
60. There are further constraints imposed on states' freedom of choice. Their implemen-
tation plans must respect the prevention of deterioration and nonattainment provisions of the
Act. Congress provided for zoning and then specified the allowable deterioration in each of
the three kinds of zones for two pollutants. Id. § 749 1. Eventually deterioration criteria are to
be specified by the EPA for all pollutants for which there exist ambient air quality standards.
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1. New source performance standards
New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) are uniform na-
tional emission standards for new sources of air pollution.61 Central
regulation of pollution from new industrial sources is important for
two reasons. First, new industrial facilities are more likely to move to
areas with less stringent controls in the face of isolated attempts at
regulation. Second, central regulation provides economies of scale in
determining what controls might be demanded of new industrial facil-
ities. The federal standards are applied by states on an individualized
basis, thus allowing for local review and appreciation of factors such
as siting.
2. Air quality standards
The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to establish uniform air
quality standards for hazardous pollutants arising from numerous
sources. 62 Although United States ambient air quality standards are
asserted to be based on neutral scientific criteria indicating safe
threshold values, 63 it is generally conceded in the United States that
available evidence is insufficient to avoid the need to make subjective
assessments of risk. Indeed, the standards are the result of a cost ben-
efit analysis which values health benefits highly, something which a
local decision maker would not be readily able to do given its greater
sensitivity to local and short term concerns.
In addition to the political externality ground, there are other
reasons justifying centralized setting of air quality standards. To the
extent that setting ambient air quality standards requires gathering
and evaluating general technical information, another reason for the
Non-deterioration of visibility is a special concern in areas classified by the Act as not to be
subject to lessening of air quality. Id. If an area has not attained air quality standards, the
state plan must require especially stringent conditions in the permits issued under it. Id.
§§ 7501-08. For prevention of deterioration, visibility protection, and nonattainment, the
EPA is to issue regulations which are to be incorporated in state plans.
The Act imposes uniform standards on new vehicles, but concedes to the EPA the author-
ity to grant postponements, Id. § 7521, and the authority to permit qualified states (e.g., Cali-
fornia) to require stricter standards. Id. § 7543. The EPA may permit other states not
meeting air quality standards to adopt the California standards. Id. § 7507.
61. Id. § 7411.
62. Id. §§ 7408-09. Two kinds of standards are to be established. Primary standards
protect human health. Secondary standards, whose attainment is less urgent, protect general
welfare. Standards were initially established for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, total sus-
pended particulates, ozone, carbon monoxide, and hydrocarbons. Lead was later added. See
Del Duca, supra note 58, at 187.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1982).
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central formulation of these standards is the administrative economy
of scale. That states have not, with the exception of such notable
cases as California,64 attempted to confront their air pollution
problems merely on their own initiative suggests the need for the pres-
ent federal role in standard setting, notwithstanding the arguments
for local autonomy. Increased scientific understanding and greater
public awareness of air pollution may be changing this circumstance.
3. State implementation plans
The states are responsible for developing plans (State Implemen-
tation Plans or SIPs) to meet EPA air quality standards. 65 States
have free choice of how to meet the standards subject to the con-
straint that the EPA approve the plan.66 The EPA's power to ap-
prove the plans and to substitute its own plan when a state does not
produce a satisfactory plan is essential to achieve ambient air quality
standards.67
Nonetheless, the states actually decide the details of which, and
to what extent, sources are subject to controls. Additionally, the
states' more extensive bureaucratic resources are better able to deter-
mine case by case the controls to be applied in each permit issued
under the SIP and to monitor compliance. A state also may impose
stricter controls than required under its federally approved SIP if it so
desires.68 The margin of discretion left to the state bureaucracies in
implementing the standards is appropriately subject to local demo-
cratic direction by state legislative control over budgets and adminis-
trative organization and by state executive and legislative control of
the selection of administrative managers.
a. EPA pushed states
The case of Pennsylvania illustrates the importance of EPA ap-
64. For California's extensive regulation of air control, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 39000-44384 (Deering 1986 & Supp. 1988).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982).
66. For a study illustrating the economic and environmental difficulties which must be
confronted in developing a SIP, see Ohio River Basin Energy Study (ORBES), National Tech-
nical Information Service (EPA), no. PB 81-161788 (1981).
67. For example, the United States has prosecuted utilities for exceeding sulfur dioxide
emission limits under the Pennsylvania SIP in United States v. West Penn Power, 460 F. Supp.
1305 (W.D. Pa. 1978), cited by L. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT
(1982).
68. See, e.g., Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266
(1975).
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proval of state implementation plans.69
A 1960 Pennsylvania law created an air pollution commission
with five state government representatives and six public representa-
tives, which set standards and issued air pollution abatement orders.
70
Technical qualifications demanded of the public representatives were
such that industry representatives dominated the board. 71 In 1970
Pennsylvania created the Department of Environmental Resources,
with comprehensive permitting, planning, and enforcement
authority.
72
At no time during the ten years from when Pennsylvania first
became active in air pollution control until the federal Clean Air Act
of 1970 were adequate technical and administrative resources devoted
to the task of air pollution control. In fact, a major issue in EPA
approval of Pennsylvania's SIP was the number of state personnel to
be employed in administering the plan. In 1973 the state employed
approximately 115 to 120 people in air pollution control.7 3 To ap-
prove the plan, the EPA required increasing employment to 305
people.
74
b. Transportation control plans
The importance of the EPA's power of intervention is further
illustrated by the controversy over transportation control plans.7"
The Clean Air Act of 1970 allowed the EPA to require provision for
periodic inspection and testing of motor vehicles to be included in
State Implementation Plans as a condition of their approval. 76 The
EPA's first attempt to require states to adopt such plans was unsuc-
cessful. These plans would have required not only inspection and
maintenance of cars, but also would have limited the use of cars in
major cities. Following inconclusive and conflicting results in litiga-
tion concerning the EPA's statutory and constitutional authority to
69. State implementation plan provisions appear in 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
70. C. JONES, CLEAN AIR: THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF POLLUTION CONTROL 50-52
(1975).
71. Id. at 50.
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-1(23) (Purdon Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35
§ 4004 (Purdon Supp. 1987); see C. JONES, supra note 70, at 232.
73. C. JONES, supra note 70, at 237.
74. Id.
75. See Ostrov, Inspection and Maintenance of Automotive Pollution Controls: A Decade-
Long Struggle Among Congress, EPA and the States, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 139 (1984).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(G) (1982).
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impose the controls,7 7 the political furor led to abandonment of the
attempt in its extreme form.
Congress responded in 1979 by giving the EPA additional power
to require imposition of such controls as part of efforts to meet ambi-
ent air quality standards. First, for areas that would not meet ambi-
ent air quality limits within statutory deadlines, a construction
moratorium on new sources of air pollution was imposed.7 8 Second,
for areas without adequate plans the EPA was authorized to disap-
prove Clean Air Act projects and grants, and the Department of
Transportation was authorized not to approve highway projects and
grants. 79 Third, the EPA was authorized to withhold sewage treat-
ment grants from noncomplying states.
80
When the EPA again attempted to require vehicle inspection and
maintenance programs as part of SIPs, it met with greater success. At
least fourteen states now have functioning programs. 81 In California
and Pennsylvania the EPA had to invoke the moratorium and fund-
ing cut off provisions to persuade the state legislatures to adopt the
necessary measures. 82
The inspection and maintenance programs involve a short visit
once a year or every two years to a garage for the check and possibly
minor repairs to the vehicle. The inconvenience and costs are low,
and the emission reductions are significant.83 The outcome of the
controversy illustrates how central authorities are able to take a
longer range perspective than local officials. Because they are less
subject to short term political considerations, they were able to perse-
vere in having the program adopted.
At the same time the controversy illustrates the need for both
local administration and local political decision-making, even though
in the context of federal bounds. The EPA itself was manifestly inca-
pable of running the inspection programs. The programs were possi-
ble only when designed and run by local officials in ways consistent
77. Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th
Cir. 1975), vacated, EPA v. Maryland, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215
(4th Cir. 1975), vacated, EPA v. Maryland, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train,
521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated, EPA v. Maryland, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(i) (1982).
79. Id. § 7506(a).
80. Id. § 7616(b)(2).
81. Ostrov, supra note 75, at 141.
82. Id. at 157-59 (describing the associated administrative and litigation battle).
83. Id. at 163-90.
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with local needs. The diversity of ways in organizing the inspections
reflects these divergent local needs.
c. Diversity
The variety of state administrative and political structures which
have been adopted to meet the action requirements of federal legisla-
tion further reflects the opportunities for adaptation to local needs. A
brief discussion of the institutional arrangements of three states for air
pollution control will illustrate the effect of federal legislation. In all
three states, new state legislation was adopted in response to the 1970
Clean Air Act.
The Illinois Environmental Protection Act of 1970 created three
state agencies. 84 The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency8 5 rec-
ommends standards,86 grants permits,87 and undertakes enforcement
action. 88 The latter responsibility is in competition with enforcement
actions brought by the attorney general and citizen suits. The Pollu-
tion Control Board, comprised of five full time members with its own
staff and funds,8 9 sets environmental standards and adjudicates dis-
putes.90 Thirdly, the Illinois Institute for Environmental Quality un-
dertakes planning and research. 91
The 1970 Washington Clean Air Act 92 created a three member
Hearing Appeal Board, 93 but both state officials and the nine active
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 1001-61 (1983). For general discussions of the Illi-
nois Act, see E. HASKELL & V. PRICE, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: CASE STUD-
IES OF NINE STATES (1973); Currie, Illinois Pollution Law, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 389 (1975).
85. Created by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111'/2, para. 1004 (1983), given responsibility for
federal Clean Air Act duties by para. 1004(m). In 1978 the legislature amended the Act to
explicitly provide that state requirements were to be in line with federal requirements. Id.
para. 1009.1.
86. Id. para. 1004.
87. Id. para. 1039.
88. Id. para. 1004.
89. Id. para. 1005.
90. Id. para. 1010.
91. Id. para. 1006.
92. Wash. Laws 1970, Ex. Sess., ch. 62 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 43.21B.005-.009 (1985)). The 1970 Act, providing exclusively for the Pollution Control
Hearings Board, dovetails with the earlier 1957 Act, (codified as amended at WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 70.94..011-.950 (1985)), which regulates air pollution more generally.
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21B.020 (1985). Enforcement options included obtaining
judicial injunctions, fines up to $250 per day per violation, and prison terms for up to a year.
Id. § 70.94.25, .430, .431. The Act also provides for state development of contingency plans
for acute air pollution episodes and gives the governor the power to halt emissions on an
emergency basis. Id. §§ 70.94.710, .715, .720, .725, .730.
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regional air authorities 94 could undertake standard setting, permit-
ting, and enforcement. 95 The boards of the regional authorities repre-
sent major cities and counties in their territories.96 Decisions of both
state and regional authorities were appealed to the Hearing Appeal
Board,97 after which judicial review in state courts could be sought.98
Although the state had the power to fix minimum standards,99 and to
substitute itself for the regional authority if it found action by a re-
gional authority inadequate,' °° the regional authorities had substan-
tially greater effective power because of their larger staffs. For
example, in 1971 the Puget Sound authority, whose territory included
Seattle, had a staff of fifty whereas the entire state staff consisted of
only thirty-two people. 10 1
In 1972 New York state created a superagency, the Department
of Environmental Conservation,10 2 with responsibility for air pollu-
tion.10 3 As in many other states, the principal city, New York City,
had a larger enforcement staff for air pollution than the state. Thus
the New York City staff of 300 was delegated responsibility for air
pollution matters within the city. 104
C. Conclusion
There are many issues worthy of substantive reflection in any at-
tempt to reform the Clean Air Act. These include questions such as:
the wisdom of the Act's "technology forcing" approach; its reliance
on command and control regulation to the substantial exclusion of
economic incentive approaches; and the significant regulatory bur-
dens which it imposes. The present analysis does not attempt to ad-
dress these issues. It does, however, support the contention that the
basic federal character of United States air pollution control policy is
sound and should remain unchanged. Although there is a climate of
encouraging reduced federal activity in all fields, and hence a ten-
dency to argue for a reduced federal role in air pollution prevention,
94. E. HASKELL & V. PRICE, supra note 84, at 70.
95. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.94.141, .151, .152, .181, .211 (1985).
96. Id. § 70.94.100. See E. HASKELL & V. PRICE, supra note 84, at 84.
97. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21B.110 (1985).
98. Id. §§ 43.21B.180, .190, . 0.
99. Id. § 70.94.331 (Supp. 1987).
100. Id. § 70.94.410 (1985).
101. E. HASKELL & V. PRICE, supra note 84, at 41.
102. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 19-0101-0711 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988).
103. Id. § 19-0301; see E. HASKELL & V. PRICE, supra note 84, at 136.
104. E. HASKELL & V. PRICE, supra note 84, at 138.
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in fact a federal role has been critical to spurring widespread state
action. Notwithstanding the importance of the federal impetus, the
primary administrative burden of permitting the approximately
200,000 stationary sources subject to federal requirements10 5 is on the
states. Moreover, within the constraint of meeting the federal mini-
mum air quality standards, the states have substantial autonomy in
establishing organizational and control priorities.
IV. FRANCE
Despite its lack of formal provision for local autonomy, French
air pollution control law has delegated substantial authority to local
administrative officials of the central government. Accordingly, it is
relevant to the present study. In fact, the relations between the local
and central bureaucrats manifest phenomena similar to those of the
United States system, notwithstanding the absence of local demo-
cratic autonomy in the French system. Thus, the French experience
also demonstates the usefulness of a central power of impulsion to
overcome local inertia.
The French industrial air pollution control program requires sig-
nificant local bureaucratic decisions. Although these bureaucrats all
work for the central state, they have substantial autonomy from the
central bureaucracy by being the authorities who deal directly with
specific pollution sources. The central authorities cannot effectively
eliminate this discretion because of the sheer number of local sources.
Moreover, they may not even want to limit such discretion because it
spreads responsibility otherwise born exclusively by the central
level. 106
However, the central authority retains its supremacy and the au-
tonomy of the local bureaucrat is not complete. The following three
factors limit the autonomy of local bureaucrats: the uniform profes-
sional background of the deciding local bureaucrats, the use of branch
contracts, and the use of arretes types.
10 7
After discussing the actual air pollution control program, the
prospects for the establishment of local political autonomy in France
with respect to air pollution control will be reviewed. So far, the de-
centralization policy initiated in the first years of the Mitterand presi-
105. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 10 at 1200 (citing EPA, EPA EN-
FORCEMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT 5-6 (1975)).
106. In this sense, see J. PADIOLEAU, L'ETAT AU CONCRET 127-28 (1982).
107. "Arretes types" are standard orders. See infra text accompanying notes 162-163.
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dency has had no practical impact on French air pollution control. 108
Prior to the decentralization policy the key administrative actors were
the environment ministry, the departmental prefects, and the engi-
neers in the central and peripheral offices of the environment minis-
try. 109 The environment ministry has been converted into a
secretariat of state under the control of the prime minister. 110 The
role of prefects is now filled by the Commissaires de la Republique,
and the peripheral offices of the environment ministry have been
renamed. These nominal changes have not altered the preexisting bu-
reaucratic system. Whether the policy of developing local political
autonomy, which is the innovation of the decentralization program,
will eventually be extended to air pollution control remains to be seen.
A. French Air Pollution Law
The principal laws on air pollution are a 1961 statute which reg-
ulates air pollution generally' and a 1976 statute'1 2 which reworks a
system of regulating industrial installations traceable back to 1810.113
These laws have been implemented over the years by a complex of
decrees and other administrative actions.
1. General central functions
Two parts of French air pollution control policy without local
input are the national standards on the quality of fuel for heating" 4
and the administratively determined national limits on vehicle
emissions. "15
108. Prieur, La Politique regionale de l'environnement en France, 1984 REVUE JURIDIQUE
DE L'ENvIRONNEMENT 107 (1984) (discusses the limited decentralization of environmental
policy with respect to regional planning).
109. See M. DESPAX, DROIT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT (1980).
110. Decree no. 83-297 of Apr. 13, 1983, 1983 Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise
[J.O.] 1171.
111. Law no. 61-842 of Aug. 2, 1961, 1961 J.0. 7195.
112. Law no. 76-663 of July 19, 1976, 1976 J.O. 4320.
113. See C. GABOLDE, LES INSTALLATIONS CLASSEES POUR LA PROTECTION DE
L'ENVIRONNEMENT 1-11 (1978).
114. The national limit on sulfur content of heating and diesel fuel decreased from 0.5% to
0.3% in 1980 in conformity with Community norms. Orders of Mar. 28, 1980, 1980 J.0. 824;
Orders of Dec. 6, 1977, 1977 J.O. 5848. For Community norms, see infra notes 346-352. For
a complete list of French fuel quality limits, see M. DESPAX & W. COULET, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN FRANCE 20 (2d ed. 1982).
115. The basic provision is article R. 69 of the Code de la Route, decree no. 69-150 of Feb.
5, 1969, 1969 J.0. 1479, 1969 Receuil Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] 87, 92, which specifies
that vehicles should not cause emissions "susceptibles d'incommoder la population ou de com-
prommettre la sante et la securitepubliques. (likely to inconvenience the people or compromise
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Zones of special protection may be created for major urban areas
to reduce emissions from heating and other combustion.1- 1 6 Because
the four existing zones for Paris, Lille, Lyon, and Marseille were es-
tablished several years apart, it can be presumed that local political
preferences could play an actual role in the designation of such zones,
even though the decree regulating establishment of the zones leaves
all responsibility to the central administration.
The active national air quality monitoring program, commenced
in 1971, likewise permits token local input. 17 There are 120 pollution
monitoring networks linked by computer distributed throughout
France."18 These networks are used to provide background informa-
tion and, for nine of the monitoring networks, to determine when to
order fuel switching or closing of major industrial facilities because of
peak concentrations." 9 At the national level the environment minis-
try is responsible for the monitoring program. 20 At the local level,
the public health and security)." Based on this decree and the express references of an air
pollution law, the law of Aug. 2, 1961, 1961 J.O. 7195, to vehicular pollution, central authori-
ties have issued a series of arretes (orders).
In conformity with Community directives, these orders establish norms for new cars.
Carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions were first regulated effective September 1, 1972.
Order of June 30, 1970, 1970 J.O. 8191. In 1975 national controls were administratively
adapted to the 1974 amendments of the Community standards. 1975 J.O. 2207, 2216, 2229.
Nitrogen oxide emissions from gasoline cars were regulated after October 1, 1977 pursuant to
European Economic Community [EEC] directive 77/120/EEC, 1977 J.O. 7064. The limits for
carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides were reduced 15, 10, and 15 percent
respectively after October 1, 1979 in compliance with Community rules. Order of Oct. 4,
1977, 1977 J.O. 7064. The limits are subject to change in conformity with new EEC standards.
Smoke limits for diesel engines as a function of motor size were established effective Octo-
ber 1, 1975 by the order of Feb. 13, 1974, 1974 J.O. 3965, and updated by the order of Jan. 3,
1978. 1978 J.O. 721. The sulfur content of gas oil has been regulated by the same provisions
as domestic fuel. The limits are subject to change pending new EEC standards.
In compliance with Community norms lead limits in gasoline were set at 0.50 gramsAiter
as of January 1979, and 0.40 grams per liter as of January 1981. Orders of Oct. 13, 1978, 1978
J.O. 3649-50.
116. Articles 2 & 3, decree no. 74-415 of May 13, 1974, 1974 J.O. 5178, permit the estab-
lishment of zones of special protection by interministerial decree. Zones have been established
for Paris, order of Aug. 11, 1964, 1964 J.O. 7617, modified by order of Sept. 22, 1978, 1978
J.O. 3597, suburban Paris, order of Sept. 22, 1978, 1978 J.O. 3598, Lille, order of Feb. 26,
1974, 1974 J.O. 2602, Lyon, order of Feb. 1974, 1974 J.O. 2603, and Marseille order of Apr. 8,
1981, 1981 J.O. 3993.
117. See Dambrine & Bartaire, Air Pollution Monitoring Networks in FRANCE/Imple-
mentation of the European Directive 80/779/EEC, MINISTERE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT 2
(Aug. 1984); F. BILLAUDOT & M. BESSON-GUILLAUMOT, ENVIRONNEMENT URBANISME
CADRE DE VIE: LE DROrr ET L'ADMINISTrRATION 267-68 (1979).
118. Dambrine & Bartaire, supra note 117, at 4.
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id. at 6.
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the peripheral offices of the environment ministry under the direction
of the Commissaires de la Republique have this responsibility. 2 If an
individual plant is responsible for most emissions in an area, it pays
for and runs a monitoring network. Otherwise, monitoring networks
are to be run by local associations composed of industry, municipal
government, state bureaucracy, and local environmental group repre-
sentatives.1 22 Although there are those who point to this control of
local monitoring networks as an example of local autonomy, the is-
sues over which the local body has control are of too minimal an im-
portance to involve the local political responsibility inherent in the
concept of autonomy.
The Agence pour la Qualite de l'Air (Clean Air Agency), in oper-
ation since 1983,123 facilitates and performs activities of surveillance,
prevention, and distribution of information with regard to air pollu-
tion. It is directed by a council composed one third each of state,
local government, and various interest group representatives. The
agency is empowered to borrow, give subsidies, and collect air pollu-
tion taxes.1 24 The Agency's action has been limited to subsidizing re-
search, development, and demonstration monitoring networks and to
public education.
1 25
2. Classified installation system
The classified installation system regulates industrial pollution.
The objectives of the law on classified installations are to protect
health, public safety, and the environment. 126 Balancing the costs and
effectiveness of available control techniques against the desired envi-
ronmental quality of the surrounding area is an integral part of the
statute's implementation. The permits issued under the law must take
into account:
d'une part, de l'efficacite des techniques disponibles et de leur
121. Id.
122. Id. at 6-7.
123. The law no. 80-513 of July 7, 1980, 1980 J.O. 1704, established the agency. See
AGENCE POUR LA QUALITE DE L'AIR, RAPPORT D'ACTIVrrE 3 (1983) [hereinafter AGENCE].
124. 1980 J.O. 1704.
125. AGENCE, supra note 123, at 3.
126. The sources covered by the law no. 76-663 of July 19, 1976, 1976 J.O. 4320, include
not only new industrial installations, but also state and local installations (with the notable
exception of nuclear power plants), noncommercial installations, and petroleum related instal-
lations (which had previously been exempted). Decree no. 77-1133 of Sept. 21, 1977, 1977 J.O.
4897, implemented the 1976 law. See generally C. GABOLDE, supra note 113; M. PRIEUR,
PREMIERE PARTIE, LA POLLUTION ATMOSPHERIQUE EN DROIT FRANCAIS (1976).
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economie, d'autre part, de la qualite, de la vocation et de
l'utilisation des milieux environnants (on the one hand, the effi-
ciency and economy of the available techniques, and on the other,
the quality, designation, and use of the surrounding areas).' 27
In accordance with the philosophy of balancing and realistic assess-
ment of costs, the engineers who evaluate permit applications are first
instructed to perform a technical and economic review of the emission
controls which could be imposed on the source with a view to requir-
ing the best technology economically achievable. A second part of the
analysis is to consider whether the residual emissions will be compati-
ble with the desired quality of the ambient environment. The general
emphasis is to be on prevention rather than waste treatment. 28
The Conseil d'Etat, the highest central administrative body as
well as the administrative court of last instance, is to establish lists of
first and second class industrial activities. 29 Installations falling
within one of the first class categories are required to hold an operat-
ing permit from the departmental prefect (now Commissaire de la Re-
publique). Such permits are issued following the enquete publique
procedure designed to solicit public comment on the permit applica-
tion. 130 Installations of the second class are required only to declare
themselves to the prefect. The 1976 law on classified installations
reformed the previous 1917 law. Although it formally expanded the
coverage of the classified installations regulatory scheme, in practice
control may have been lessened. Not only has the Conseil d'Etat been
127. Article 17, decree no. 77-1133 of Sept. 21, 1977. This article incorporates the princi-
ple firmly established in French administrative law by the well known decision of the Council
of State in Ville Nouvelle Est. Decision of May 28, 1971, Conseil d'Etat (Council of State),
1972 Receuil Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence [D.S. Jur.] 194. The Council of State held that in
expropriation of private property for a public purpose, the declaration of public utility is
proper only if the burdens imposed on private property rights and the financial costs are not
excessive with regard to the interest motivating the expropriation. For extensive literature
commenting on the case, see R. Hostiou, Amenagement et environnement: le contentieux as-
sociatifdevant lesjuridictions administratives, 10 DROIT ET VILLE 215, 223 n.29 (1980); see
also F. CABALLERO, ESSAI SUR LA NOTION JURIDIQUE DE NUISANCE 93-103 (1981) (who after
identifying the decision as the foundation of a new principle of cost benefit analysis in French
administrative law concludes that as a practical matter it has little relevance).
128. MINISTERE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DU CADRE DE VIE, INDUSTRIALISATION
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN FRANCE 4-5 (Apr. 1979) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENT
MINISTRY].
129. Article 28, law no. 76-663 of July 19, 1976; see also C. GABOLDE, supra note 113, at
32-40.
130. Law no. 83-630 of July 12, 1983, 1983 J.O. 2156; art. 5, law no. 76-663 of July 19,
1976, 1976 J.O. 4320; art. 5 of decree no. 77-1133 of Sept. 21, 1977, 1977 J.O. 4897.
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hesitant to expand the list of industries covered,131 but it has also sig-
nificantly raised the threshold limits permitting an industrial installa-
tion to operate merely by declaration. 32
Each year about 2500 permits are issued after an enquete pub-
lique for new or modified first class installations. 33 There exist about
50,000 first class and 550,000 second class installations. 34 About
10,000 declarations regarding second class installations are registered
annually. 13
5
B. Limitations on Local Bureaucratic Autonomy
Three factors significantly limit local bureaucratic independence
generally, and the prefect's autonomy in particular. These factors are:
(1) the uniform professional training of the engineers who actually
determine the content of air pollution permits (corps des mines), (2)
branch contracts, and (3) arretes types (standard orders).
1. Corps des mines
The engineers of the corps des mines who process individual per-
mit applications are crucial to the French system of air pollution con-
trol because of the case by case balancing approach it adopts. Their
competence makes case by case determinations feasible. And, the
elite character of the corps ensures substantial uniformity of
approach.
Through the early 1970's the corps had only 300 members. 36
These engineers graduate from an Ecole des Mines, prestigious schools
located in Paris, St. Etienne, and Nancy, 37 at which only about 190
students are accepted each year. 38 The successful applicants are vir-
tually all graduates of the Ecole Polytechnique, a military school
through which much of the French political and corporate elite
passes. 139 At the Ecoles des Mines, the professors are overwhelmingly
members of the corps des mines.140
131. F. CABALLERO, supra note 127, at 53.
132. Id. at 109-112.
133. ENVIRONMENT MINISTRY, supra note 128, at 4.
134. F. BILLAUDOT & M. BESSON-GUILLAUMOT, supra note 117, at 261.
135. ENVIRONMENT MINISTRY, supra note 128, at 4.
136. E. SULEIMAN, ELITES IN FRENCH SOCIETY: THE POLIcs OF SURVIVAL 210, 218
(1978).
137. Id. at 69.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 29, 39, 99.
140. Id. at 120, 123.
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The members of the corps des mines who evaluate permit applica-
tions work in a Direction Regionale de l'Industrie et de la Recherche
(Regional Office of Industry and Research).' 4 ' Each Regional Office
may assist the prefects of as many as nine departments. 42 Each Di-
rection is a peripheral office of the environment ministry. The levels
of pollution control required for each permit are determined by nego-
tiation between the engineer and the industrial installation in light of
the economic ability of the installation to implement them. 43 It is
almost unthinkable that an industrial installation would be closed for
failure to conform to permit conditions. 14
There are a number of reasons that members of the corps des
mines get along well with industry. Although its members work for
the environment ministry, they are largely on loan from the ministry
of industry. At the environment ministry's creation in 1971, the prob-
lem of staffing the ministry was resolved by lending it personnel from
other sources. 145 Thus in 1971 there were 377 engineers on loan from
the ministry of industry to the environment ministry. 46
What happened in 1970, however, was more than the simple res-
olution of a personnel resource problem. The corps des mines is but
one of a number of elite corps. Its long standing rival is the corps des
ponts et chaussees,'47 traditionally responsible for public works con-
struction. In the early 1970's as the corps des ponts et chaussees was
becoming active in urban and regional planning, the corps des mines
jump into the environment ministry represented a means of maintain-
ing its position relative to its traditional rival.1 48 In fact the "lending"
of personnel from a grand corps to other state administrations is a
141. Each Regional Office has sections responsible for various kinds of environmental
problems including air pollution.
142. DOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE, REPERTOIRE PERMANENT DE L'ADMINISTRATION
FRANCAISE 296 (39th ed. 1981).
143. F. CABALLERO, supra note 127, at 129, 149.
144. Id. at 149.
145. [Lies directions et services des administrations centrales charges de ces attributions
sont places sous son autorite et les serices departementaux et regionaux des adminis-
trations concernees sont mis a sa disposition en tant que besoin (The offices of the
central administrations charged with these attributions are placed under its author-
ity, and the departmental and regional services of the administrations concerned are
placed at its disposition as needed.)
Article 2, decree no. 71-94 of Feb. 2, 1971, 1971 J.O. 1182.
146. M. DESPAX, DROIT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT 521 (1980).
147. The corps des ponts et chaussees is the corps of bridges and ways, the group of engi-
neers responsible for public works.
148. E. SULEIMAN, supra note 136, at 214-17.
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common practice and serves to increase the prestige of the corps. 14 9
Moreover, the engineers have close links with the industry they
regulate. Since 1969 they have received an additional preparation in a
training institute financed jointly by the public bureaucracy and by
industry. They share this course with the industry engineers with
whom they are to deal in their regulatory activity.150 Graduates of
the ecoles des mines also routinely move from positions as civil ser-
vants to important jobs with industry.15'
The competence of the corps des mines is undoubtedly an asset to
the implementation of French air pollution control. However, the or-
igin of the corps in the ministry of industry necessarily affects its out-
look on environmental issues.
2. Branch contracts
Five branch contracts, dealing principally with water pollution,
were signed by the Minister of Environment and industry representa-
tives between 1972 and 1977.52 In these contracts the industrial par-
ties and the Minister agreed on a timetable for control and the extent
of control. The industrial parties received subsidies for control invest-
ments. The contracts' contents were then embodied by the environ-
ment ministry in orders binding on the prefects.
From 1972 to 1980 there were six branch programs, distin-
guished from branch contracts in that no government subsidies are
involved. 5 3 These agreements affected industries with significant air
pollution problems and principally involved agreements with industry
on the timing and extent of pollution control investments. In an addi-
tional case, an agreement was reached with a large conglomerate,
149. E. SULEIMAN, POLITICS, POWER, AND BUREAUCRACY IN FRANCE: THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE ELITE 243-47 (1974).
150. Id. at 158-59.
151. E. SULEIMAN, supra note 136, at 210.
152. The contracts were signed with the following industries: Pate a papier (paper mills)
(1972), Industrie sucriere (sugar refining industry) (1973), Feculerie, levurie (starch and yeast
factories) (1975), Distillerie (distilleries) (1975), and Delainage, megisserie, lavage et peignage
de laine (wool processors) (1977). For descriptions of the contracts and of the generally posi-
tive results obtained, see AGENCE PRESSE ENVIRONNEMENT, LA POLITIQUE CONTRAC-
TUELLE D'ANTIPOLLUTION (LE MOIS DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT (DOSSIERS)) 5-7 (Nov. 1980).
153. These agreements were with the following industries: Cimenteries (cement) (1972),
Traitements de surface (surface treatments) (1972), Electrolyse des chlorures alcalins (elec-
trolosis of alkyl chlorides) (1974), and Equarrissages (fertilizer manufacturers) (1977). For
details of the agreements and of the generally successful results obtained, see ENVIRONMENT
MINISTRY supra note 128, at 8-12. The branch program for the cement industry is discussed
in J. PADIOLEAU, supra note 106. See also the agreements referenced in notes 154 and 156.
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Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann, on the controls to be applied to its vari-
ous businesses. 154 Other large French companies did not seek such
agreements, preferring instead to negotiate with the environment min-
istry on problems as they arose. 155
One example of a branch program is that dealing with air pollu-
tion from asbestos. The branch contract was signed by the environ-
ment minister and the two firms which represent 80% of French
asbestos consumption. 156 Provisions of the contract 157 concerning
work processes and pollution control investments were then embodied
in a technical instruction issued by the environment ministry to the
prefects to guide their application of the law on classified
installations. 15
8
The legality of contractual agreements with industry has been
questioned on the theory that the administration ought not to be able
to bargain over matters which are within its unilateral duty to regu-
late. 159 Administrative jurisprudence has avoided facing the ques-
tion. 160 Likewise, the contractual agreements have been criticized as
lessening the obligations that would otherwise be imposed on indus-
try.16 1 These criticisms have practical merit only to the extent that all
of the theoretically applicable controls would in fact be rigorously ap-
plied absent a collective agreement.
3. Arretes types
Another kind of instrument used to limit discretion, the arrete
type, is an order issued by the Environment Ministry. It can be issued
as a circulaire (circular), as an instruction (direction), or as an arret
(order). It may or may not be published in the Journal Officiel de la
Republique Francaise.162
154. For details, see ENVIRONMENT MINISTRY, supra note 128 at 3.
155. Author's personal conversations with French industrialists.
156. ASSOCIATION FRANCAISE DE L'AMIANTE, ASSOCIATION FRANCAISE DE
L'AMIANTE: L'INDUSTRIE REND COMPTE DE CINQ ANNEES DE TRAVAIL 31 (1981).
157. For text, see id. at 100-08.
158. Technical instruction of Jan. 29, 1981. For text, see id. at 109-13.
159. F. CABALLERO, supra note 127 at 152-57.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. A publication of the environment ministry compiles twenty-five of these arretes types,
MINISTERE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DU CADRE DE VIE, PRINCIPAUX TEXTES LEGISLA-
TIFS ET REGLEMENTAIRES RELATIFS A LA LuTra CONTRE LA POLLUTION ATMOSPHER-
IQUE, INSTALLATIONS CLASEES (DIRECTION DE LA PREVENTION DES POLLUTIONS, SERVICE
DES PROBLEMES DE L'ATMOSPHERE) (Apr. 1979). Of the twenty-five texts, twenty were circu-
laires published in the Journal Officiel de la Reoiublique Francaise [Journal Officiel]. One was
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Arretes types have been issued for a large number of very specific
kinds of industrial installations. They are ordinarily quite precise as
to what technical controls must be applied. The fact that standards
can be established unilaterally by the Environment Minister via ar-
retes types has, incidentally, been an important incentive for the indus-
trial parties to branch agreements to negotiate them.
Arretes types, like branch contracts, bind the prefects (now Com-
missaires de la Republique, analogously to how SIP's and NSPS's con-
strain state permitting decisions in the American system. In practice
they bind the prefect thereby preventing excessive susceptibility to lo-
cal interests and pressures.163 They also provide for application of a
level of technical expertise which, despite the existence of support to
the prefect by the corps des mines, could not otherwise be brought to
bear on each individual case. Yet, the prefect still has responsibility
for application of the arrete type to each permit application. Such
delegation relieves central authorities of a substantial administrative
burden and, within the bound of the arrete type, permits local appreci-
ation of the unique facts of each application.
C. The French Approach to Community Law
Because France is a unitary state164 whose constitution vests sub-
stantial power in the public administration, it has not had difficulty in
complying with European Economic Community environmental di-
rectives. 1 65 Community norms have been routinely incorporated into
French environmental law by administrative order.1 66 The reticence
of the French judiciary towards Community law is accordingly not a
an arrete published in the Journal Officiel, and two were unpublished instructions. They were
all technical, formulated in mandatory style, and directed to very specific kinds of industrial
installations, e.g., sugar beet refineries, storage depots for nonrefrigerated liquid ammonia, al-
kaline chloride electrolysis workshops, etc. A more complete listing can be found in Installa-
tions Classees pour la Protection de l'Environnement, no. 1001, Tome I (Textes Generaux,
Nomenclature) 1979, no. 1001-I; Tome II (arretes types) 1978, no. 1001-I; Tome III (Arretes,
circulaires et instructions) 1978, no. 1001-II; and updating supplements, Journal Officiel de la
Republique Francaise; see also M. DESPAX & W. COULET, supra note 114, at 21.
163. However, such susceptibility is presumably less than in other systems' local authori-
ties by virtue of the fact that prefects are administrative agents of central authorities.
164. Here "unitary state" is used to distinguish from a federal state, such as the United
States, or a regional state, such as Italy or Spain.
165. Community air pollution directives are reviewed infra at notes 346-375. For an over-
view of the French approach to Community law, see T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY LAW, 232-37 (1981).
166. See, e.g., supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
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major factor in French air pollution control. 67
167. The French courts have disagreed on the acceptability of Community law. Article 55
of the constitution provides for the supremacy of regularly ratified or approved international
law so long as such law is reciprocally applied by other states. In 1975 the Conseil Constitu-
tionnel (Constitutional Court) seemed to open the way for easy acceptance of Community law.
Judgment of Jan. 15, 1975, 1975 Receuil Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence [D.S. Jur.] 529. In a case
challenging a proposed law on abortion as inconsistent with the European Convention on
Human Rights, the Constitutional Court held that a refusal to apply a national law because of
its inconsistency with an international rule is not an exercise of constitutional review jurisdic-
tion. Under this holding, the ordinary civil and administrative courts could address questions
of both the applicability of Community law and of its supremacy over national law without
crossing the boundary into the territory of constitutional review, from which they are prohib-
ited.
The Cour de Cassation (France's highest court of ordinary jurisdiction) a few months later
followed the Constitutional Court's lead. Judgment of May 24, 1975, Cass. ch. mix., 1975 D.S.
Jur. 497, 506; 2 COMMON MKT. L.R. 336 (1975). The court held that Community law took
priority over national law enacted subsequent to ratification of the EEC Treaty. It also found
that the power of member states to bring proceedings before the European Community Court
of Justice against other member states which fail to comply with the EEC Treaty satisfied the
reciprocity requirement. Shortly afterwards it held that the Treaty also prevails over earlier
French legislation. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1975, Troisi~me section civile (Cass. civ. 3e], 1976
D.S. Jur. 33, 39-40; 2 COMMON MKT. L.R. 152 (1976).
Unfortunately for the application of Community jurisprudence, the Council of State (the
highest administrative court) has rejected this principle. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1979, Conseil
d'Etat, 36 L'ACTUALITE JURIDIQUE: DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 39 (1980); see also Judgment of
Mar. 1968, Conseil d'Etat, 1968 D.S. Jur. 285, 286; 1970 COMMON MKT. L.R. 395 (refusal to
disapply legislative text conflicting with earlier Community regulation). In a case challenging
the election procedures for representatives to the European Parliament, the Council of State
observed that assessing the conformity of a national law adopted subsequent to the EEC
Treaty would be equivalent to passing on its constitutionality, a power which the Council of
State lacks. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1979, Conseil d'Etat, 36 L'ACTUALITE JURIDIQUE: DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF 39 (1980). If the Council of State persists in its view that disapplication of a
national law because of its nonconformity with Community law is a constitutional question,
the effective supremacy of Community law will be seriously limited in France. This is because
the Constitutional Court can only pass on the constitutionality of a law prior to its promulga-
tion.
Moreover, the Council of State has created an additional barrier to the application of
Community law in France. It has squarely rejected the Court of Justice's view of direct appli-
cability by holding that only acts first received into national law may have any effect in internal
law. Judgment of Dec. 22, 1978, Conseil d'Etat, 1979 D.S. Jur. 155 (commonly known as
Cohn-Bendit); reconfirmed by Savincast, Nov. 28, 1980, Centre international dentaire, Feb. 25,
1981.
Even more threatening for the application of Community law than rejection of the direct
effect doctrine is the reasoning by which the Council of State reached this conclusion. The
Council of State rejected the direct effect doctrine based on a literal reading of article 189 of
the treaty. It found the treaty language to be so clear that no reference to the Community
Court was required to interpret it. Reliance on the so called acte clair doctrine provides the
Council of State with an easy way to avoid its obligations under article 177 of the EEC treaty
to refer questions to the Court of Justice. See generally Bebr, The Rambling Ghost of "Cohn-
Bendit": Acte Clair and the Court of Justice, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 439 (1983).
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D. The 1982-83 Decentralization Reform
The 1982-1983 decentralization reform was (and remains) a sig-
nificant departure from previous French practice. Although numer-
ous attempts have been made over the years to decentralize
bureaucratic responsibility, no previous attempt had tried to combine
local bureaucratic responsibility with local political autonomy.168
The territorial fragmentation of France (36,000 communes of which
28,000 have populations of less than 2,000)169 and the fear of encour-
aging clientelism 170 effectively impeded such decentralization.
The 1982 law addressing rights and liberties of communes, de-
partments, and regions instituted the decentralization policy. 171 It
gives these territorial subdivisions new significance.
Regions were statutorily instituted in 1972 as strictly administra-
tive structures with economic planning, coordination, and infrastruc-
ture related resposibilities. 172 They were run by regional prefects
whose duties paralleled those of the departmental prefects about to be
described.
Unlike the regions, communes and departments have existed
since the French revolution. Following the chaos of the revolution,
the departments were established as administrative territories within
which it was possible to reach the central seat of administration by
168. Although decentralization was never undertaken until 1982, it was certainly talked
about a lot. See Y. MENY, CENTRALISATION ET DECENTRALISATION DANS LE DEBAT POLl-
TIQUE FRANCAIS (1945-1969) (1974) (commenting on the development of themes of participa-
tion, responsibility, legitimacy, and autonomy in French political debate on decentralization).
169. Meny, Amministrazione statale epoteri locali in Francia, 1984 Riv. TRIM. DI DIRITTO
PUBBLICO 556, 558 [hereinafter Meny, Amministrazione]; see also Meny, La politica de decen-
tramento in Francia del governo Mauroy: Legittimazione, integrazione e burocratizzazione, 12
LE REGIONI 332, 339-40 (1984) [hereinafter Meny, La politica]. Italy in contrast has only
about 8,000 communes. S. CASSESE, IL SISTEMA AMMINISTRATIVO ITALIANO 144 (1983). Of
these, about 90% have less than 10,000 inhabitants, and only 1% have more than 60,000. Id.
at 163.
170. Meny, Amministrazione, supra note 169, at 562-63.
171. Law no. 82-213 of Mar. 2, 1982, 1982 J.O. 730, amended by 1982 J.O. 779 (relating to
the rights and immunities of communes, departments, and regions). The Conseil Constitution-
nel found the law constitutional except for a provision making local government decisions
executory before th. representative of the central government had a chance to determine
whether to institute review before the administrative courts. Decision no. 82-137 DC of Feb.
25, 1982, 1982 J.O. 759; 38 L'ACTUALITE JURIDIQUE: DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 294 (1982).
Law no. 82-623 of July 22, 1982, 1982 J.O. 2347, remedied this problem. For lists of imple-
menting texts, see Y. MENY, ADMINISTRATION 82 53-57 (1983); M. HENRY-MEININGER & Y.
MENY, ADMINISTRATION 83 16-20 (1984) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION 83].
172. Law no. 72-619 of July 5, 1972, 1972 J.O. 7176.
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one day's travel. The law of 28 pluviose an 8 (February 17, 1800)173
created the prefectoral system to run the departments and to oversee
the communes. Initially, the central government chose both prefects
and mayors.' 74 As the nineteenth century progressed, mayors and the
municipal and departmental councils came to be elected. 175 However,
the departmental prefect retained ultimate authority for all local ad-
ministrative decisions.
The prefects constituted a relatively homogeneous professional
corps of bureaucrats. 176 There was low turnover within the corps,
and prefects were frequently rotated from one department to
another. 177
Two developments eroded the prefects' authority. The creation
of field services in the new, specialized ministries following the Second
World War limited the prefects' power because the prefects lacked the
knowledge to control the ministries' activity. 178 Moreover, although
mayors as local elected officials formally had little power, the cumula-
tion of local and national elected offices gave them jointly the political
power to control the prefects' careers. 179 A prefect was no match for
a mayor of a large city, who was also a member of parliament and
perhaps even a minister. This was, of course, irrelevant to the vast
majority of small communes.
The 1982 law retained the concept of elected councils for com-
munes and departments, and anticipated the creation of a popularly
elected regional council. 180 The mayor's election by the municipal
council also remained unchanged. The great innovation of the 1982
law was to make local government independent of the central admin-
istration by removing the former control by prefects over local gov-
ernmental actions. To do this it abolished the departmental and
regional prefects. The law established that the popularly elected re-
gional and departmental councils are to choose from their respective
bodies a regional' 18 and a departmental 182 president. These presidents
173. H. MACHIN, THE PREFECT IN FRENCH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 17 (1977).
174. J. VIE, LA DECENTRALISATION SANS ILLUSION 27 (1982).
175. Id. at 33-34.
176. H. MACHIN, supra note 173, at 188-293.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 31, 139-42; see also Auby, La nouvelle organisation departementale, 38
L'Actualite Juridique: Droit Administratif 331, 337 (1982).
179. H. MACHIN, supra note 173, at 34.
180. Law no. 82-213 of Mar. 2, 1982, art. 59, 1982 J.O. 730, amended by 1982 J.O. 779.
181. Id. art. 71.
182. Id. art. 24.
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are to assume the prefect's previous position as the territorial official
with executive power. 8 3 The prefect was replaced by a representative
of the state (Commissaire de la Republique).18 4 In theory the only
central control remaining over the acts of communes, departments,
and regions was the power of this representative to refer acts to the
administrative courts for a review of their legality."8 " Because of the
previous erosion of prefectoral authority, abolition of the prefects,
while of unquestionable symbolic importance, is not the most impor-
tant result of the law. The most important results were the potential
for reduction of central administrative control and the establishment
of local democratic power.
Additionally, the 1982 law restricted control of local decision-
making to the local elected assemblies and administrative judicial re-
view. Other potential instruments, such as referendums or public
hearing procedures,186 were not authorized.
Further, the 1982 law established the structure of local govern-
ment, but said nothing about which subjects local authorities would
govern. A 1983 law 8 7 started the process of transferring powers to
local government entities. This process has been continued by a com-
plicated set of measures giving the local government entities their own
financial resources in the form of block grants from the State. 88 The
principal subject matter transfers so far have involved education and
social benefits. Responsibility for these two subject areas is now
shared in a complex way between the state and the three local govern-
ment levels. Criteria involved in the distribution of responsibility in-
clude the size and importance of the facilities involved and whether
personnel or capital decisions are involved. 189
Many question the wisdom of decentralization. One former pre-
fect fears that local democracy will not produce management as effec-
tive as the prefectoral system. He believes that local control will
183. Id. arts. 25-26 (for departments); art. 73 (for regions); see also art. 11, law no. 83-8 of
Jan. 7, 1983, 1983 J.O. 215-20, amended by, 1983 J.O. 706 (regarding the reallocation of juris-
diction among the communes, the departments, the regions and the state).
184. Law no. 82-213 of Mar. 2, 1982, art. 34, 1982 J.O. 730, amended by 1982 J.O. 779,
(department); art. 79 (region).
185. See id. arts. 3, 46, & 69, for communes, departments, and regions respectively. The
state representative for the department is the referring authority for both communes and the
department.
186. Meny, La politica, supra note 169, at 339-40.
187. Law no. 83-8 of Jan. 7, 1983 J.O. 215.
188. See ADMINISTRATION 83, supra note 171 at 12-13.
189. Id. at 11-12.
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politicize decision-making in a negative way, that local deci-
sionmakers will consider only the short run, and that regional imbal-
ances will be exacerbated. 190 The 1982 law also created new
administrative structures without suppressing the old ones. This mul-
tiplication of structures will lead either to inefficiency or to the need
for state control sufficiently detailed to frustrate the aims of decentral-
ization.191 In fact the state retains substantial means to control local
discretion. The 1982 law instituting the regionalization process pro-
vided that the state could limit local discretion by imposing technical
norms under national laws or under decrees in application of a na-
tional law provided that such norms were generally applicable to indi-
viduals or to legal entities (under either public or private law). 192
It is difficult to foresee the medium and long term results of de-
centralization in France. One possibility is that the decentralization
policy will have little effect on the conduct of government decision-
making. The local administrations of major cities will continue to
have the degree of independence they had already de facto achieved
under the old system. The only substantive difference could be that
the judicial review of decision-making by the numerous small com-
munes will prove less flexible and accommodating than prefectoral
control. Another scenario is that local autonomy could become quite
real and lead to strong politicization of local decision-making along
with extensive patronage arrangements. 193 Perhaps the most that can
be asserted for the present is that the French experiment with decen-
tralization offers an opportunity for achieving greater legitimacy
through local democratic responsibility. Whether the relative sound-
ness of the previous system of central administration will be retained
and even whether the decentralization policy will amount to more
than window dressing are questions which it is as yet too soon to
answer.
E. Conclusion: the Lack of Local Democratic Control
The French tradition of central control and technocracy has pro-
duced a system analogous to that of the United States with regard to
the relationships between central and local authorities. This similar-
ity is surprising given the structural differences between the two sys-
190. J. VIE, supra note 174, at 118-23.
191. Meny, La politica, supra note 169, at 343-49.
192. Law no. 82-213 of Mar. 2, 1982, art. 90, 1982 J.O. 730, amended by 1982 J.O. 779.
193. These two possibilities are hypothesized by Meny, La politica, supra note 169.
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tems. Specifically, French central authorities have provided
minimum control levels for local permitting decisions through branch
contracts and arretes types paralleling the minimum standards the
United States Congress has imposed on the states.
Moreover, French central authorities ensure efficient local action
on permitting decisions by providing the staff which evaluates permit
applications. In addition to ensuring that local action occurs, the
staffing of the central and local offices of the environment ministry by
an elite corps of engineers provides the expertise which makes feasible
the case by case determinations required by the French approach to
air pollution control.
Although the United States EPA passes primarily on the suffi-
ciency of local permitting efforts through its approval of SIPs and
assumes local permitting responsibility only as a last resort, the net
result of ensuring action is the same in both systems. The requisite
degree of uniformity is maintained by intervention of the environment
ministry through informal administrative review and through use of
arretes types and branch contracts dealing with entire categories of
industry.
The substantial difference between the United States and French
systems is that the French bureaucratic centralization has left virtu-
ally no meaningful role for local democratic input to the local bureau-
cratic decision-making.19 This poses a serious legitimacy problem,
which might be ameliorated by transferring the peripheral offices of
the environment ministry from the prefects' (Commissaires' de la Re-
publique) authority to the authority of the elected regional or depart-
mental councils. Because of the administration's broad powers under
the present constitution to act independently of legislative checks,
special attention ought to be given to curing the local legitimacy prob-
lem in the context of the decentralization policy.
V. ITALY
Italy's air pollution control program suffers from a lack of re-
sources, poorly conceptualized administrative organization,19 and ex-
194. Padioleau urges the incorporation of local public input as an important reform. J.
PADIOLEAU, supra note 106, at 136.
195. Una peculiare e non secondaria ragione di inefficienza degli apparati pubblici in
materia di ambiente e sempre stata individuata in una legislazione che, come la nostra,
affidi compiti di tutela e salvaguardia a troppi poteri, ciascuno dei quali ha un pezzo di
competenza e dispone di strutture ad essa correlate. Con la nota consequenza che
quando ipoteri sono troppi e non coordinati tra loro e come se non cifosse alcun potere.
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cessively frequent reforms. Administrative reorganizations or new air
pollution laws have occurred every three or four years since the mid
1960s.
Although the Italian Parliament produces a great quantity of
statutes, it frequently overlooks the problems involved in their imple-
mentation. Consequently, Italian legislation is characterized by a lack
of: (1) clear language, (2) funding provisions, and (3) identification of
the administrative bodies responsible for its implementation.196 It-
aly's specific legislation on air pollution shares these general
characteristics.
Italy has not had any effective central administrative power for
air pollution control. Some tools to modify this state of affairs are
available to central level executive authorities. The Italian judicial
system also provides a number of partial remedies. Additionally,
Community rules may work to provide the central impetus and con-
trol now lacking. Despite these possibilities for improvement, the sta-
tus quo may persist. General confusion about the proper organization
of government, including problems of clientelism and of the distribu-
tion of powers between local and central authorities, impedes reform
and promotes the current pattern of general inaction interrupted by
occasional isolated interventions.
A. Constitutional context
The Italian constitution of 1948 declares Italy to be a regional
state. 197 Italy is now divided into fifteen ordinary statute regions and
five special statute regions. The five special statute regions have spe-
cial charters approved by constitutional laws. These charters give
(A peculiar and non secondary reason for the inefficiency of the public bureaucracy
in environmental matters is our legislation which gives protective powers to too
many powers, each of which has only a fragmented piece of jurisdiction. The notable
consequence is that when powers are too many and non coordinated, it is as if there
were no power.)
F. GIAMPIETRO, DIRITTO ALLA SALUBRITA DELL'AMBIENTE: INQUINAMENTI E RIFORMA
SANITARIA 57 (1980); see also G. AMENDOLA, IN NOME DEL POPOLO INQUINATO: MANUALE
GIURIDICO DI AUTODIFESA ECOLOGICA 57-59 (1985) (complaining of the lack of administra-
tive infrastructure and of the lack of clarity in the overlapping laws treating air pollution); A.
POSTIGLIONE, MANUALE DELL'AMBIENTE: GUIDA ALLA LEGISLAZIONE AMBIENTALE 40-41
(1984).
196. See A. Postiglione, Manuale dell'ambiente: Guida alla legislazione ambientale 40-41
(1984); Marziale, I 'Suggerimenti per la redazione dei testi normativi'della regione Toscana: un
esempio da imitare, 108 Foro Italiano V [Foro It. VI 265 (1985).
197. See P. BARILE, ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITFO PUBBLICO 423-54 (3d ed. 1978); Putnam,
Leonardi, Nanetti, & Pavoncello, Explaining Institutional Success: The Case of Italian Re-
gional Government, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 55 (1983).
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them a slightly greater degree of autonomy than that provided for
ordinary statute regions. All regions have popularly elected regional
councils which select from their number a regional executive commit-
tee and a president.
Article 117 of the Constitution lists the subject matters in which
regions have legislative competence within the bounds of national
framework laws. Article 118 provides that the regions are to have
administrative competence for the subject matters listed in article
117,198 along with administrative competence for such other matters
as the State may delegate.
The Constitution provides a complicated mechanism for central
control of regional legislative acts. The Constitutional Court has ju-
risdiction to determine whether regional legislative action exceeds the
bounds of article 117. If the central government is dissatisfied with
the merit of a regional law, it may request the regional council to
reconsider it. 199 Further, if a regional council acts contrary to the
Constitution or commits grave violations of law, the President of the
Republic may dissolve the regional council and require new
elections. 2o o
198. Article 117 provides:
Within the limits of the fundamental principles established by the laws of the State,
the Region legislates in regard to the following matters, provided that such legisla-
tion is not in contrast with the national interest and that of other Regions:
Organization of the offices and the administrative bodies dependent on the Re-
gion;
Town boundaries;
Urban and rural local police;
Fairs and markets;
Public charities and health and hospital assistance;
Professional and craft training and scholastic assistance;
Museums and libraries of local bodies;
Urban planning;
Tourism and hotel industry;
Rail and bus services of regional interest;
Roads, acqueducts and public works of regional interest;
Lake navigation and ports;
Mineral and spa waters;
Quarries and peat bogs;
Hunting;
Fishing in internal waters;
Agriculture and forestry;
Artisanship;
Other matters indicated by constitutional laws;
The laws of Republic may delegate to the Region the power to issue norms for their
implementation.
COSTITUZIONE [COST.] art. 117.
199. Id. art. 125.
200. Id. art. 126.
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Whether environmental protection falls within one of the listed
categories of article 117 determines whether the regions may have
general legislative powers, albeit within the context of national frame-
work laws, for environmental matters. Regions may have general leg-
islative powers for matters not presently listed in article 117 only
when it is amended by constitutional law. On the other hand, the last
sentence of article 117 says that state laws may delegate legislative
power to regions to provide for their implementation. Thus, for ex-
ample, article 7, presidential decree law no. 616 of 1977, accords re-
gions such legislative powers over the same matters for which it
transfers them administrative jurisdiction.
201
Moreover, after article 118 states that regions are to have admin-
istrative competence for the matters listed in article 117, it further
provides that the state may delegate administrative responsibility for
such other matters as it chooses to the regions.
In this situation, the precise constitutional basis for regional envi-
ronmental protection action may be either that the state has elected to
delegate to regions administrative action jurisdiction to protect the
environment or that environmental protection is within regional legis-
lative jurisdiction because it falls within one of the categories listed in
article 117.
It is difficult to fit air pollution within one of the matters for
which regions have legislative power pursuant to article 117.202 The
Constitutional Court's ample definition of environmental protection
renders this effort yet more difficult. The Court has stated: "Environ-
ment protection includes ... protection of the countryside, as well as
the advancement of health and the defense of the earth, air and water
from pollution. ' 20 3 This definition would seem to exclude environ-
mental protection from all of the matters listed in article 117, except
perhaps urban planning. Additionally, in the same decision, the Con-
stitutional Court seems to deny that environmental protection can be
included within the concept of urban planning.2°4 At most, the Court
seems to say, urban planning could be considered a limited part of
201. Presidential Decree Law no. 616 of July 24, 1977, Suppl. Ord. Gaz. Uff. no. 234 of
Aug. 29, 1977, in implementation of the delegation of Law no. 382 of July 22, 1985, Gazzetta
Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana [Gaz. Uff.] no. 220 of Aug. 20, 1975.
202. For the complete text of Article 117, see supra note 198.
203. Judgment no. 239 of Dec. 29, 1982, Corte cost., 61 Raccolta ufficiale delle sentenze e
ordinanze dell Corte costitutionale [Race. uff. corte cost.] 489, 498 (1982), 27 Giurisprudenza
Costituzionale [Giur. cost.] 2307 (1982).
204. Id.
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environmental protection. The question which gave rise to the deci-
sion regarded the legitimacy of a regional law which prohibited devel-
opment along coast lines. The constitutional question raised was
whether the matter covered by the regional law fell within the subject
matter of urban planning, a subject matter of regional competence, or
rather within the protection of the countryside, a state subject matter
pursuant to article 9 of the Constitution. The Court found that urban
planning included regulation of development in both rural and urban
areas.
In a 1972 decision, 205 the Court declared that the term "urban
planning" must retain its original meaning as drafted into the Consti-
tution by the Constituent Assembly. This view has been criticized on
the ground that the Court drew the meaning of the concept of urban
planning from a 1942 law, which does not clearly define the term.20 6
A more important criticism is that it is a mistake to freeze constitu-
tional interpretations to those of the Constituent Assembly. 20 7 At
least one author, relying on an older decision by the Constitutional
Court on another point,208 has suggested that the better view is to
interpret the text of the Constitution in light of the legislation cur-
rently in force. However, complete disregard of the Constituent As-
sembly would negate the guarantee function of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, if the constitutional norms concerning regional powers
are considered as programmatic norms for future legislation and con-
stitutional jurisprudence rather than as guarantees of either regional
autonomy or central supremacy, then reference to the legislation in
force as an instrument of interpretation is justifiable.
The means adopted to implement the constitutional vision of re-
gionalism reinforce this latter view. Presidential decree law no. 616/
205. Judgment no. 141 of July 24, 1972, Corte cost., 36 Racc. uff. corte cost. 263, 276-77,
17 Giur. cost. 1415, 1424 (1972).
206. Assini, Urbanistica e tutela dell'ambiente nella giurisprudenza della Corte costituzion-
ale, 28 Giur. cost. 1056 (1983).
207. Id. at 1060-61. The Constituent Assembly drafted the post World War II
Constitution.
208. See id. at 1061 (citing Judgment no. 66 of December 22, 1961, Corte cost., 12 Racc.
uff. corte cost. 271, 6 Giur. cost. 1240 (1961)). However, this decision contains only the lim-
ited observation that "the formulae used in the Statutes [the charters of the Italian regions,
which are considered of constitutional rank] must be interpreted according to the meaning that
they have in common legislative language and in the legal order in force..." 12 Racc. uff.
corte cost. at 278, 6 Giur. cost. at 1247-48. Although the regional statute to which the Court
refers had constitutional rank, it is not possible to tell from the decision whether the Court
meant to refer to the legal order in force at the moment of the issuance of the Statute or at the
moment of the Statute's interpretion.
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1977, the fundamental norm for implementing the constitutional pro-
visions on regionalism, does not carefully follow the list set forth by
article 117. Instead, it identifies four broad categories of matters
transferred to the regions: administrative organization, social services,
economic development, and land use. 20 9 Although these four broad
categories generally cover the matters listed in article 117, the Parlia-
ment clearly did not feel obligated to follow article 117 literally.
Article 80 of presidential decree law no. 616/1977 includes envi-
ronmental protection within its definition of urban planning. 210 To
maintain that the article 80 definition of urban planning is limited to
zoning is an artificial interpretation, counter to the actual transfer of
jurisdiction to the regions. 2 1 The broad definition of urban planning
in article 80 is in the context of the transfer of administrative jurisdic-
tion to the regions. If this definition is at all persuasive in determining
the meaning of urban planning for purposes of article 117 (that is, for
identifying the jurisdictions constitutionally due to the regions), then
it would seem that the regions should have legislative power for envi-
ronmental matters. Although the constitutional model of regionalism
permits national framework laws to set the bounds of regional legisla-
tion, the capacity of the regions to legislate within those limits in envi-
ronmental matters would be a means of increasing their political
responsibility.
To reach a result consistent with actual legislative and adminis-
trative practice is compatible with the role of the Constitutional Court
in the Italian system. Italy is not a federal state formed by the union
of sovereign states like the United States. On the contrary, it is a
unitary and centralized state which is decentralizing itself. Conse-
quently, the function of the Constitutional Court is not to support and
reinforce the central power. Such a centralizing function may have
been the role of the United States Supreme Court at one time, and
may currently be the role of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities. But in the unitary system, the role of the Constitu-
tional Court should be to encourage a balanced development of re-
gionalism. While the Court must encourage the development of
regional autonomy, it should also encourage an effective central
209. Presidential Decree Law no. 616, art. 3.
210. Id. art. 80. Article 80 provides that "the administrative functions relative to the sub-
ject matter of 'urban planning' concern regulation of the use of territory including all cogni-
tive, normative and managerial aspects of operations of safeguard and transformation of the
land as well as protection of the environment." Id.
211. See Assini, supra note 206, at 1065.
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power of direction, motivation, and, if necessary when faced with re-
gional inertia, substitution for local authorities.
So far the Court's orientation on questions of central power has
been encouraging. It has approved the adoption of procedural and
methodological standards for regional activities in urban planning.
212
In so doing, it has recognized the central function of guidance and
coordination. More recently, it has found that the central govern-
ment retains important powers for environmental protection notwith-
standing the extensive regional responsibilities for environmental
protection. The Court affirmed that the State retains general residual
powers for environmental protection, and that the constitutional obli-
gation to protect the countryside applied to both the State and re-
gions. The Court thus indicated its vision of regional autonomy as
not absolute, but instead as limited by the power of the State to fill in
the gaps left by local inertia and other shortcomings of regional ac-
tion.21 3 It remains to be seen, however, whether the Court would con-
sider more invasive provisions adopted by Parliament or the
Government as violating the constitutionally protected sphere of re-
gional autonomy.
B. Italian Air Pollution Law
Despite the recent creation of the Ministry of Environment, 214 a
ministry without portfolio and hence without significant staff, the Ital-
ian public administration system is not adequately organized to con-
front issues of environmental protection. At the central level the
responsibilities for environmental protection are distributed among at
least thirteen different ministries. 215 At the regional level there is a
similar lack of coherent administrative organization.
Until recently there was no statutory basis for adequate central
powers of intervention to control and stimulate the regional and com-
munal public administrations. The recent law which established the
Ministry of Environment could provide a basis to compensate for the
regional and local inertia. This law permits the Ministry of Environ-
ment to substitute itself for the regions, the provinces and the com-
212. Judgment no. 141, Racc. uff. corte cost. at 283, 17 Giur. cost. at 283.
213. Judgments nos. 151, 152, 153 of June 27, 1986, Corte cost., Gazz. Uff., prima serie
speciale no. 31 of July 2, 1986; Judgment no. 359 of December 21, 1985, Corte cost., Gazz.
Uff., prima serie speciale, no. 1 of January 8, 1986.
214. Law no. 349 of July 8, 1986, Suppl. Ord. Gazz. Uff. no. 162 of July 15, 1986.
215. M. GUTrIERES & U. RUFFOLO, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLU-
TION CONTROL IN ITALY 20-22 (2nd ed. 1982).
[Vol. 10:497
Air Pollution Control
munes when they fail to implement or observe a provision of law
concerning environmental protection if serious environmental damage
could result. 216 Additionally, if the regional administration persist-
ently fails to exercise an environmental function delegated by the
State, the Ministry of Environment can require directly that the nec-
essary action be taken.
217
Even with the new substitutive powers of the Ministry of Envi-
ronment, the problems of implementation at the regional and local
levels remain. Existing legislation has not established administrative
structures capable of confronting air pollution adequately. That is, in
addition to the faulty conception of relations between central and lo-
cal powers, there is a major lack of valid bureaucratic organization at
all levels. This is due in part to the lack of political will to create such
organization and in part to the lack of coordination between the vari-
ous state laws.
The governing provisions on air pollution are three superimposed
laws passed in 1934, 1966, and 1978. The texts providing for develop-
ment of Italy's regions as autonomous administrative and political en-
tities add another layer of complexity. It has been suggested that new
legislation is desirable to clean up the interpretive mess, if for no other
reason.21
8
European Community environmental legislation may provide the
necessary stimulus to national legislative reform. Community envi-
ronmental directives benefit Italy by providing the central establish-
ment of standards missing at the national level. 219 For example, the
directives fixing ambient air quality limits 220 set uniform goals and
provide deadlines for compliance.
Community legislation stimulates national reform in ways diffi-
cult to quantify. Nevertheless, as a result of the need to integrate the
Community directive on sulfur dioxide and particulates into national
law, the Ministry of Health is directing an effort to draft, and eventu-
ally propose, a new, comprehensive air pollution control law.221 An
216. Law no. 349 of 1986, art. 8(3).
217. Id. art. 9(3).
218. Fuzio, L'assetto delle competenze in materia di inquinamento atmosferico dopo il DPR
no. 616 del 1977 e la legge di riforma sanitaria, 16 GIURISPRUDENZA DI MERMrO IV [GIUR.
MERrro] 224, 226-27 (1984).
219. See B. DENrE & P. KNOEPFEL, supra note 19, at 202-03 (concurring in examples
given).
220. See infra notes 354-367 and accompanying text.
221. F. GIAMPIETRO, supra note 195, at 269.
1988]
Loy. L.A. Int' & Comp. L.J.
example of Community stimulus is the adoption of a national law to
comply with the Community directive on sulfur content of fuel oil.222
Conclusions regarding the effects of Community environmental
legislation on national legislation are tentative, however, because of
Italy's slowness to implement Community directives in all subject
matters. As an interim solution to the problem, a 1982 law223 dele-
gated to the government the power to receive into national law ninety
seven directives issued from 1964 to 1980. The necessity of relying on
such measures is due to the complexity of Italian politics which
causes Community law issues to receive a lower priority than national
political issues.224 It may also be due to the low level of parliamentary
involvement in the formulation of national input into the establish-
ment of directives, as well as to some extent a deliberate political
choice to go slow on implementation. 225
The basic Italian scheme for regulating air pollution is not in
itself terribly complex. In essence, air quality limits are centrally es-
tablished, but industrial sources must seek operating permits from lo-
cal mayors. The mayor must in turn seek a binding opinion from a
regional advisory body, the Comitato Regionale contro l'Inquinamento
Atmosferico (CRIA) (Regional Committee against Air Pollution) or
its equivalent, on what controls to impose on the plant. Air pollution
from space heating is controlled under a separate permitting system
through comunes. 226 Fuel quality limits227 and uniform standards for
222. M. GUTTIERES & U. RuFFOLO, supra note 215 at 49.
223. Law no. 42 of Feb. 9, 1982, Gaz. Uff. no. 55 of Feb. 25, 1982. The Community
directives on lead in gasoline and on sulfur in gas oil, see infra notes 351-52, were among those
implemented pursuant to this law. Presidential Decree Law no. 485 of May 10, 1982, Gaz.
Uff. no. 208 of July 30, 1982; Presidential Decree Law no. 400 of June 8, 1982, Gaz. Uff. no.
181 of July 3, 1982.
224. One author has called the delay in implementing Community norms a reflection of
political backwardness. Grassi, Parlamento, Governo, Regioni e Attuazione delle direttive
Comunitarie [nel D.D.L governativo 7 Agosto 1982], 11 LE REGIONI 652, 652-53 n.3 (1983)
(noting that over 100 proceedings were pending before the Court of Justice regarding Italy's
delays in implementing Community directives).
225. See Tizzano, La corte costituzionale e il diritto cornunitario, 107 Foro Italiano Corte
cost. [Foro It.], I 2062, 2074 (1984); see also Cassese, La regle et les derogations: Le systeme
politico-administratif italien et les directives communautaires, 1985 REVUE FRANCAISE
D'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 265.
226. Presidential Decree Law no. 616, art. 104.
227. Presidential Decree Law no. 1391 of Dec. 22, 1970, art. 14 Suppl. Ord. Gaz. Uff. no.
59 of Mar. 8, 1971; Law no. 615 of July 13, 1966, arts. 8-19, Gaz. Uff. no. 201 of Aug. 13, 1966
(anticipated limits on fuel quality and a permitting program for combustion installations).
These provisions were modified by Presidential Decree Law no. 400 of June 8, 1982, Gaz. Uff.
no. 181 of July 3, 1982, in order to comply with the Community directive, 18 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 307) 23 (1975), 75/716/EEC, on the sulfur content of gas oil. The directive
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vehicles are centrally established. 228 Electric power plants are also
centrally regulated.
1. 1934 health code
The oldest of the three laws treating air pollution is the 1934
Testo Unico delle leggi sanitarie.229 As part of a general codification
of public health law, this statute established a system of classified in-
stallations for regulating industrial pollution.23° Under this law, the
Minister of Health maintains a list of two categories of industry re-
quired to seek permits from mayors. First class industries are those
which must be removed from areas of habitation unless a particular
demonstration of safety is made. Second class industries are those
which require special precautions for the health and safety of the
neighborhood.
Mayors are responsible for licensing the industrial facilities lo-
cated in their communes which fall within either of these two catego-
ries. In the thirties, mayors may have been competent to license the
typical industries of the period. However, a mayor acting without
bureaucratic support is incapable of determining under what condi-
tions to license a modem industrial facility such as a refinery. Unfor-
tunately, subsequent legislation on air pollution, although making
some effort to bring technical expertise to bear on the licensing prob-
lem, has not constituted an effective substitute for the essentially per-
sonal role of the mayor.
The useful feature of this 1934 law is its provision for central
establishment of industrial categories. Central classification of haz-
ardous industries represents a significant economy of scale over a sys-
tem in which each region would establish its own classifications. It
also provides a basis on which national emission limits might be estab-
lished by industrial category, although no such limits have been
established.
requires type A fuel to have 0.3% maximum sulfur content by 1980 and type B fuel to have
0.5% maximum sulfur content by 1980. The Italian law mandates the type A limit only in
1985 and the type B limit only in 1983.
228. See infra note 245.
229. Testo Unico delle Leggi Sanitare (TULS], arts. 216-17, approved by Royal Decree no.
1265 of July 27, 1934, Suppl. Ord. Gaz. Uff. no. 186 of Aug. 9, 1934.
230. Id.
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2. 1966 air pollution control law
The second law on air pollution, Law no. 615 of July 13, 1966,231
establishes a general framework for limiting emissions. 232 Although
the law deals with all kinds of air pollution, the winter smog problems
of northern Italy arising from domestic heating and the inversions
typical of the area in winter were a particular motivation for the
law.233 This may help explain why the law's provisions on industrial
pollution do not seem well thought out.234
The 1966 law does not repeal the law on classified installations
just described.235 The mayor apparently retains the powers granted
under the 1934 law to block operation of polluting industrial facili-
ties.236 However, the 1966 law imposes on industry an additional gen-
eral obligation not to increase ambient concentrations by applying
emission controls within the strictest limits that technical progress
permits.
2 37
The law's 1971 implementing decree for industrial installations
231. Law no. 615, of July 13, 1966, Gaz. Uff. no. 201 of Aug. 13, 1966.
232. However, electric power plants are treated separately: (1) by Law no. 880 of Dec. 18,
1973, Gaz. Uff. no. 6 of Jan. 7, 1974, which requires approval of construction plans by an
interministerial committee, fixes special limits for electric power plant contributions to ambi-
ent sulfur dioxide concentrations and requires each electric power plant to have its own moni-
toring network, and (2) by Law no. 393 of Aug. 2, 1975, Gaz. Uff. no. 224 of Aug. 23, 1975,
which involves the regions in the siting of nuclear power plants and permits government con-
trol of fuel choice and quality in fossil fuel power plants in response to fuel shortages.
233. B. DENTE & P. KNOEPFEL, supra note 19, at 63.
234. Id.
235. Law no. 615 of 1966, article 20 expressly provides for the continued existence of the
older classified installation system established under article 216 of the TULS of 1934.
236. The continued effect of the 1934 law is still somewhat unsettled. The Council of State
in 1972 said that the 1966 law superceeded the 1934 law whereas the Court of Cassation in
1974 and 1975 affirmed that the two laws could coexist. For review of this jurisprudence, see
B. DENTE & P. KNOEPFEL, supra note 19, at 50-52 (citing Council of State, sez. II, Judgment
no. 589 of Oct. 17, 1972, 96 Repertorio del Foro Italiano 2336, para. 79 (1973) (headnote
only); Judgments of June 8, 1974 and May 24, 1975, (Corte cass. VI sez. pen., unpublished).
Nonetheless, even administrative tribunals permit mayors to exercise authority under the 1934
law. For an example in which a mayor was held to have the power under the 1934 law to
order the operator of an electric power plant to prove that it was not causing unhealthful
emissions, see Barel, Lavorazioni insalubri, impianti inquinanti e poteri del sindaco, 8 LE RE-
GIONI 205 (1980) (commenting on TAR Emilia-Romagna, Judgment no. 150 of May 22,
1979).
237. Law no. 615 of 1966, art. 20. In at least one case central authorities have intervened
to define what such techniques are. The circolare (circular) of the" Health Minister, no. 135 of
Oct. 5, 1972, provides that chimneys are to be balanced against other means of reducing ambi-
ent concentrations in deciding what controls are to be employed by sources. Foraboschi, I1
Tecnico e la Normativa Contro l'Inquinamento Atmosferico d'Origine Industriale, LA Dis-
CIPLINA GIURIDICA DELLA PROTEZIONE CONTRO GLI INQUINAMENTI §§ 7-21, 15-16 (1980).
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established ambient air concentration limits for eleven pollutants.238
However, these values only apply in areas classified in one of two
zones. 239 Cities in the center and north of Italy with more than
300,000 inhabitants and in the south of Italy with more than
1,000,000 are classified as zone B. Cities with populations of 70,000
to 300,000 in the center and north of Italy and with population of
300,000 to 1,000,000 in the south of Italy are classified as zone A.
The minister of health may for good cause classify smaller cities into
one of the two zones. Unless an area is classified into one of the two
zones, the 1966 law does not apply to it. Instead, only the 1934 law
on classified installations applies. This limited zoning scheme was an
error caused by the failure to recognize, at the time of the law's enact-
ment, that air pollution is not a local problem. In addition to not
recognizing the nonlocal nature of air pollution, the zoning scheme
skews the location of industry in a way that does not correspond to
the severity of air pollution problems and fails to consider problems of
nondegradation.
The 1971 values for ambient air quality were updated for the first
time in 1983 (by a law described below). The new values will eventu-
ally apply throughout the national territory. If an industrial source
would cause an increase in ambient concentrations beyond the estab-
lished limit values, it would not be allowed to locate in a particular
zone.24o
The 1966 law creates regional technical committees, Comitatis
Regionali contro l'Inquinamento Atmosferico (CRIA's), to instruct the
mayor on what technical controls to require as a condition for issu-
ance of an operating permit.24' These committees are collegial bodies
and have never been given extensive staffs. Their present organiza-
tional failings will be elaborated after full description of the major
legislative texts.
Decrees implementing the 1966 law for combustion installa-
tions,242 industrial installations,243 and diesel vehicles 244 were issued at
238. Presidential Decree Law no. 322 of Apr. 15, 1971, art. 8, Supp. Ord. Gaz. Uff. no.
145 of June 9, 1971. The pollutants are sulfur dioxide, chlorine, hydrochloric acid, fluorine,
hydrogen sulfide, hydrocarbons deriving from refineries, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide,
lead, inert suspended particles, and silicon dioxide particles. Id.
239. Law no. 615 of 1966, art. 2, provides for the classification.
240. Presidential Decree Law no. 322 of 1971, art. 5.
241. Law no. 615 of 1966, art. 5.
242. Presidential Decree Law no. 1391 of Dec. 22, 1970, Supp. ord. Gaz. Uff. no. 59 of
Mar. 8, 1971.
243. Presidential Decree Law no. 322 of 1971, supra note 238.
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the beginning of the 1970s. Gasoline powered vehicles were treated
by a separate law in 197 1.245 In 1973 a law dealing specially with
Venice was enacted. It provided for a planning process to deal with
pollution problems, required the use of natural gas for home heating,
and reinforced the sanctions of the 1966 law for pollution in
Venice.
24 6
3. Presidential decree law no. 616 of 1977
The first general implementation of the regionalization provi-
sions of Italy's Constitution247 hindered orderly implementation of
the existing air pollution laws. First, a 1972 reform maintained the
state's jurisdiction for air pollution,248 but gave the regions some ad-
ministrative functions. 249 Then the presidential decree law no. 616 of
1977 completely reworked the division of responsibilities between the
244. Presidential Decree Law no. 323 of Feb. 22, 1971, Supp. Ord. Gaz. Uff. no. 145 of
June 9, 1971.
245. Law no. 437 of June 3, 1971, Gaz. Uff. no. 169 of July 8, 1971, which receives the
EEC directive of 20 Mar. 1970, 13 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 159) (1970), (70/220/EEC), for
gasoline powered cars. Also, Law no. 615 of 1966, article 22 gives the health minister in
concert with four other ministers authority to issue decrees regulating emissions from internal
combustion engines. Presidential Decree Law no. 323 of 1971, setting limits on the opacity of
diesel engine exhaust emissions, was issued pursuant to this provision.
The EEC directive 290 of May 28, 1974 has been implemented by a Ministerial Decree of
Mar. 7, 1975. Directive EEC/102/77 has not been implemented. This nonimplementation
may have little consequence if Italian car producers manufacture to Community standards for
export purposes. EEC directive EEC/306/1972 on diesels was implemented by Ministerial
Decree of Aug. 5, 1974. Directive EEC/537/1977 appears not to have been implemented.
The composition of fuel for cars is controlled by the Ministry of Transportation on the
basis of regulations under the Presidential Decree Law no. 420 of June 30, 1959. The directive
78/61 1/EEC on the lead content of gasoline has been belatedly implemented by the Presiden-
tial Decree Law no. 485 of May 10, 1982, Gaz. Uff. no. 208 of July 30, 1982, corrected in Gaz.
Uff. no. 214 of Aug. 5, 1982. Although the implementing law was not adopted until 1982, the
directive's 1981 deadline was voluntarily respected by gasoline producers. ISTITUTO DI STUDI
E DOCUMENTAZIONE PER IL TERRITORIO (DOCTER), ANNUARIO EUROPEO DELL'AMBIENTE
73 (1984). Regarding Community vehicle directives, see infra note 346.
246. Law no. 171 of Apr. 16, 1973, Gaz. Uff. no. 117 of May 8, 1973. There are indica-
tions that as the result of industrial controls and the conversion of home heating from oil to
gas, the severity of Venice's air pollution problem decreased between 1973 and 1979. Is-
TITUTO SUPERIORE DI SANITA AND COMMUNE E PROVINCIA DI VENEZIA, VOL. IV, RILEVA-
MENTO DI BIOSSIDO DI ZOLFO, DI OSSIDO DI AZOTO E DI PARTICELLE IN SOSPENSIONE
NELL'ARIA NEL PERIODO FEBBRAIO 1976-DICEMBRE 1977, CONSIDERAZIONI CONCLUSIVE
RELATIVE AL QUINQUENNIO DI INDAGINI (FEBBRAIO 1973-DICEMBRE 1977) 16.
247. COST. arts. 114-33.
248. Presidential Decree Law no. 4 of Jan. 14, 1972, art. 6(7), Supp. Ord. Gaz. Uff. no. 15
of Jan. 19, 1972, implementing Law no. 281 of May 16, 1970, Gaz. Uff. no. 127 of May 22,
1970.
249. Id. art. 13(8).
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state and the regions.250
Article 101 of decree law no. 616 transferred administrative re-
sponsibility for air pollution, including the classified installation sys-
tem, to the regions. Read together with articles 102(7) and 104 of the
decree law, it reserved responsibility for controlling vehicular pollu-
tion to the state except that comunes are entitled to control emissions
of vehicles. As a matter of fact, there are no controls on vehicle emis-
sions apart from manufacturing specifications. 25' The existing laws
on electric power plants, 252 which provide for a central role in their
siting and operation, are expressly continued in force. 253 The state
also reserved to itself research activity,254 national level monitoring of
air pollution,255 and the setting of minimum emission and ambient air
quality limits. 256 Because of the need for technical expertise and be-
cause of the greater central ability to resist locational pressures, the
decree wisely reserved to central authorities the setting of minimum
emission limits. It is noteworthy, however, that no effort to set indus-
trial emission limits has been undertaken.
Other provisions of the decree indicate that the organizational
consequences for air pollution control were not well thought out in its
drafting. Provinces were given the responsibility for monitoring in-
dustrial emissions, 257 and comunes are given the responsibility for
monitoring emissions from space heating. 258 Rather than assign the
monitoring of industrial emissions to the provinces, as a matter of
logic it would have been better to give monitoring responsibility to the
body with de facto permitting authority, i.e. the regional CRIA.
Likewise, it is illogical to distinguish the larger heating installations
from industrial installations.
In any event, even prior to the 1977 organizational changes, little
250. Supra note 201.
251. Local efforts are limited to improving traffic flow. See, e.g., PROVINCIA DI MODENA,
RELAZIONE SULLO STATO DELL'AMBIENTE NELLA PROVINCIA DI MODENA 248 (1983).
252. Law no. 880 of Dec. 18, 1973, Gaz. Uff. no. 6 of Jan. 7, 1974; Law no. 393 of Aug. 2,
1975, Gaz. Uff. no. 393 of Aug. 23, 1975.
253. Supra note 201, at art. 81.
254. Id. art. 102(2).
255. Id. art. 102(3).
256. Id. art. 102(1).
257. Id. art. 104. This confirms the division of responsibilities established by Presidential
Decree Law no. 322 of 1971, art. 6.1.
258. Presidential Decree Law no. 322 of 1971, art. 6.1, Decree Law no. 68 of Mar. 17,
1980, Gaz. Uff. no. 77 of Mar. 19, 1980, converted into law with modifications by Law no. 178
of May 16, 1980, Gaz. Uff. no. 134 of May 17, 1980, also provides that communes have the
power to inspect heating installations to insure proper maintenance and operation.
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had been done to establish the administrative and technical apparatus
necessary to implement the existing 1966 law. 2 9
4. Health care reform law of 1978
Finally, following the start of the administrative reorganizations,
Law no. 833 of December 23, 1978,260 was enacted to reform the
health care system. Pollution problems were included as one of the
many responsibilites of the local and national health care services cre-
ated by the law. Because the 1978 law was intended to insure general
protection of health, it is accepted that it does not annul any of the
preexisting specialized legislation on pollution. 26'
The law gives the President of the Council of Ministers the
power to fix by decree ambient air quality standards for chemical,
physical, biological, and noise pollution in work and living environ-
ments and in the external environment. 262 These powers were exer-
cised through a 1983 decree263 which established new ambient air
quality limits. The 1983 limits will replace those established in 1971
pursuant to the 1966 law, 264 as well as those established by particular
laws for electric power plants. 26 The air quality limits set by the de-
cree are to be met by 1993,266 and efforts to meet these limits are not
to lead to degradation of air quality. 267 Regions are to develop plans
to achieve the required air quality within a maximum of ten years. In
implementing the plans, the regions are to use the national health ser-
259. See F. GIAMPIETRO, supra note 195, at 29. Another Italian magistrate has written,
[Lia c.d. legge antismog del 1966 ha dato risultati molto scarse sia per la fram-
mentarieta delle competenze sia per le carenze di una adaguata struttura sia per la
mancata previsione di un impegnofinanziario Sid, infine per una totale assenza di una
visione globale del fenomeno. (The so-called 1966 antismog law has yielded scarce
results because of the fragmentation of competences, the lack of an adequate struc-
ture, the lack of financial resources, and finally the total absence of a comprehensive
vision of the phenomenon.)
G. AMENDOLA, LA NORMATIVA AMBIENTALE NEI PAESI DELLA COMUNITA EUROPEA 249
(1975).
260. Supp. Ord. Gaz. Uff. no. 360 of Dec. 28, 1978.
261. See F. GIAMPIETRO, INQUINAMENTI AMBIENTALI E LEGISLAZIONE DELLE REGIONI
A STATUTO ORDINARIO, reprint from RICERCHE ISMERFO NO. 3.: AMBIENTE ECONOMIA
REGIONI 276-77 (E. Fanara, ed. 1984).
262. Law no. 833 of 1978, art. 4; on proposition of the Minister of Health with an opinion
of the Consiglio Sanitario Nazionale, an advisory body.
263. Decree no. 30 of Mar. 28, 1983, Supp. Ord. Gaz. Uff. no. 145 of May 28, 1983,
corrected by Gaz. Uff. no. 206 of July 28, 1983, at 6065.
264. Presidential Decree Law no. 322 of 1971, annex to art. 8.
265. Law no. 880 of 1973, art. 6; Law no. 393 of 1975, arts. 8-9.
266. Supra note 263, at art. 3.
267. Id.
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vice and the competent state technical agencies. 268
This decree is a positive contribution to air pollution control. In
addition to updating the ambient air quality limits, it makes them ap-
plicable throughout the national territory. It also introduces the prin-
ciple of nondegradation into Italian air pollution control policy. The
decree's chief insufficiencies are that it says nothing about who is to be
responsible for taking action and that it fails to adequately specify the
kinds of action to be taken. By failing to assign specific duties to the
regional CRIA's or to the new bodies created by the 1978 law, it
leaves the problem of creating effective bureaucracies in limbo. Ac-
cordingly, the decree's direction that regions are to develop air pollu-
tion control plans is largely hollow, especially in light of the fact that
it fixes no consequences should no plans or inadequate plans be
developed.
The problem of coordinating the 1978 health law with previous
legislation is serious in that the 1978 law creates entities which might
be seen as competing with the CRIA's.269 The 1978 law establishes
the unita sanitaria locale (USL) (local health unit) as the primary lo-
cal administrative unit for health care. The duties of the USL include
the identification and control of factors of harm, danger, and deterio-
ration in work and living environments; indication of measures to
eliminate risk in work and living environments; and verification of
compatibility of industrial siting with zoning.270 Notwithstanding the
creation of the USL's, the mayor remains the local public health au-
thority.271 Thus permit demands are still to be made to the mayor,
although there are those who argue that the USL's should assume this
responsibility. 272 The statute anticipates that regional laws will desig-
nate certain USL's as multizonal head quarters for environmental
problems.273
Some efforts along these lines have been made. For example, a
regional law of Emilia-Romagna provides that the multizonal head-
quarters are to provide technical support activities to local govern-
268. Id.
269. See Mantero, La tutela dell'ambiente dagli inquinamenti: Una materia tra stato, re-
gioni e enti locali, 1981 DIRn-ro E SOCIETA 195, 201 (illustrating the uncertainty of finding a
coherent interpretation of the 1978 health care reform law and the 1977 presidential decree
law on regionalization).
270. Law no. 833 of 1978, arts. 14, 20.
271. Id. art. 13.
272. Fuzio, supra note 218.
273. Law no. 833 of 1978, art. 22.
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ment units for environmental matters.274  The details of these
activities are to be governed by agreements negotiated between local
governments and the multizonal headquarters.275 Within the mul-
tizonal headquarters, there is to be a specific section with responsibil-
ity for air pollution.2 76 There is also to be an interdisciplinary
working group on air pollution.277 The regional law is a sound one in
that it provides for bureaucratic structures rather than massive com-
mittees. However, it does not speak to the relation between the re-
gional CRIA and the structures created by the 1978 law on health
care reform. A law of Toscana is even less definitive. As part of a
reshaping of the membership of its CRIA, it says that the CRIA may
"also" rely on USL's to accomplish its work. 278
One function which might appropriately be assigned to a mul-
tizonal headquarters would be the formality of receiving permit appli-
cations. Alternatively, they could be designated as the authorities to
act on the merits of permit applications. However, to substitute these
multizonal headquarters for the regional permitting authorities alto-
gether would not be advisable. The populations included in USL's are
to be from 50,000 to 200,000 people, although larger USL's are possi-
ble for the major cities.279 Even though the multizonal headquarters
serve substantial populations, they are still too small and have too
many other health care responsibilities to assemble the necessary engi-
neering skills to evaluate air pollution permit applications. The pres-
ent superposition of legislative texts does not clearly spell out the
division of duties between the health care bodies and the regional
committees created under the 1966 law (the CRIA's). To prevent
each kind of body from asserting that responsibility belongs to other
authorities, a central effort to define their roles should be made as part
of the effort to develop effective working bureaucracies.
5. Permitting process
To more fully understand the functioning of the three substantive
laws-the 1934 TULS, the 1966 anti-smog law, and the 1978 national
274. Regional Law no. 33 of Emilia-Romagna of Sept. 7, 1981, art. 2, Bulletino Ufficiale
[BU] no. 10 of Sept. 9, 1981 (regions have their own official reporters, the respective Bulletino
Ufficiale).
275. Id.
276. Id. art. 4.
277. Id. art. 6.
278. Regional Law no. 70 of Toscana of Aug. 24, 1982, art. 2, BU no. 49 of Aug. 31, 1982.
279. Law no. 833 of 1978, art. 14.
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health law, it is helpful to analyze in detail the responsibilities of the
established authorities who issue permits.
The initial request for a pollution permit is to be made to the
mayor at the time a building permit is sought for a new plant or for
modification of an existing plant.2 0 The applicant is to present a de-
tailed technical report on the industrial facility and the air pollution
associated with it, which the mayor transmits to the CRIA. 28 t The
CRIA then has sixty days to act on the permit.28 2 Before operation of
the industrial installation, an additional authorization is required
from the mayor.28 3 The 1966 law and its implementing regulation
require the mayor to include the CRIA conditions in a permit.28 4
However, the mayor also has independent power under the 1934 legis-
lation to refuse to grant a permit, to place additional conditions on it,
or to take the necessary measures when no permit at all has been
sought. 28 5 This power is potentially useful in the face of the CRIA's
frequent passivity in imposing control requirements.
The mayor has not been a very effective figure in compensating
for the inactivity of the CRIA for primarily two reasons. First, the
mayor ordinarily has no technical expertise available to make com-
plex engineering judgments. Secondly, in practice, the mayor is ordi-
narily afraid that a strong stand will direct jobs to other locations.
The regional CRIA's have also been poor decision makers. They
suffer from the same inertia as the mayor, although they have on oc-
casion responded reasonably well to particular problems which have
attracted public attention.28 6 Their problems have been threefold.
First, the division of responsibility for making decisions on particular
permits is badly distributed between central and regional authorities.
Second, the structure of CRIA's themselves is mistaken. Finally, cen-
280. Presidential Decree Law no. 322 of 1971, art. 5.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. art. 5.4.
284. Although the statute is unclear (art. 6(b)), Presidential Decree Law no. 322 of 1971,
article 5.3, confirms that the CRIA's opinion is binding on the mayor.
285. TULS of 1934, art. 217, Law no. 615 of 1966, art. 20.
286. See, e.g., Palmonari, II caso sassuolo - L 'inquinamento atmosferico ed iprovvedimenti
diprevenzione, LA DISCIPLINA GIURIDICA DELLA PROTEZIONE CONTRO GLI INQUINAMENTI:
ATTI DEL CONVEGNO NAZIONALE TENUTO A BOLOGNA IL 18-19 APRILE 1980 113-25 (1980)
(describing the response to the lead, fluorine, and particulate pollution coming from a concen-
tration in a small area of Emilia Romagna of 270 ceramic factories responsible for about 30%
of the world production).
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tral authorities have been unable to require commitment of resources
to CRIA's.
CRIA's are collegial bodies. CRIA's were originally to consist of
regional level functionaries, all of whom had significant other respon-
sibilities. 287 Assigning government officials with other full time re-
sponsibilities to a committee may not be a bad idea when broad-based
policy decisions are required. However, such an assignment is most
unwise when the position mandates detailed decisions requiring sub-
stantial engineering expertise. The system as originally envisaged by
the 1966 law might have worked if the CRIA's had been given a com-
petent staff to actually prepare permits. However, no substantial staff
was ever assigned to them during their period as state bodies.
The post war political theory of pluralism, laudable in itself, to-
gether with the fascist ideas on corporatism have led to an unfortu-
nate excessive reliance on collegial decision-making in Italy.288 In
practice, collegial bodies may be simple advisory bodies, or they may
have substantive decision-making powers. They may be entrusted
with the decision of policy matters or with the resolution of technical
matters. The individuals composing those bodies may be bureaucrats
or representatives of interest groups.
Appointment of members of collegial bodies as interest group
representatives, the exaggerated size of some of these bodies, and their
use for routine technical decisions together work to minimize any de-
liberative benefits of collegial decision-making. 28 9 Other justifications
advanced for collegial bodies are that they permit simplification of
complex procedures and ensure coherent decisions by concentrating
disjointed groups and authorities. Proponents assert that collegial
bodies provide more effective representation of group interests. They
are even considered to improve data collection capabilities. 290
It has been a mistake to entrust collegial groups of bureaucratic
officials with the responsibility for technical decisions. Responsibility
287. Law no. 615 of 1966, article 5, states that CRIA's were to consist of the following
eleven people: the president of the region, the chief health officer of the region, the chief pro-
vincial medical officer of the province of the capital of the region, the regional official for public
works, the local head of highway services, the director of the provincial chemical laboratory of
the province of the region's capital city, a meteorological expert, the head of the regional
occupational safety inspectorate, a representative of the provinces of the region, and a repre-
sentative of the Chamber of Commerce of the capital city of the region together with an expert
of his choice.
288. See generally M. CAMMELLI, L'AMMINISTRAZIONE PER COLLEGI (1980).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 77-78.
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for making decisions is excessively diffused, and the existence of a
collegial body is used as an excuse to avoid creation of a bureaucratic
body with the resources necessary to make the required technical de-
cision. In theory the practice of placing interest group representatives
on collegial bodies might be considered a salutary direct application
of the United States interest representation model.29' However, mak-
ing interest groups part of the deciding body rather than parties to
which the deciding body must react (under threat of judicial invalida-
tion of the decision if it does not) leads to paralysis of decision-mak-
ing, interest group capture, or decisions made without adequate
bureaucratic preparation.
292
The CRIA system in Italy might be somewhat more functional if
central authorities took some role in fixing emission standards by the
category of the industry. In such cases, the mayor or the local CRIA
would have a fixed set of criteria to impose in granting a permit. As it
is, the central role is limited to fixing air quality limits. The transla-
tion of air quality limits into specific emission limitations or control
technologies is quite difficult for two reasons: first, the complexities of
assessing the impacts of specific emissions on air quality levels, 293 and
second, the degree of engineering knowledge required. The Minister
of Health has the authority to give instructions on measurement
methods and maximum emission levels.294 However, it has not been
exercised.
291. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1679-81 (1975); S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 378-81 (1982); O'Brien,
The Courts and Science Policy Disputes: A Review and Commentary on the Role of the Judiciary
in Regulatory Politics, 4 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 81 (1983); Marcel, The Role of the Courts in A
Legislative and Administrative Legal System-The Use of Hard Look Review in Federal Envi-
ronmental Litigation, 62 OR. L. REv. 403 (1983).
292. These problems of collegial decision-making are not unique to Italy. To a much
lesser extent, air pollution control policies at the state level in the United States have suffered
similar problems. One case study of environmental programs in nine states concluded that the
use of administrative structures to diffuse political accountability is one of the main problems
in environmental policy. E. HASKELL & V. PRICE, supra note 84 at 243. The study not only
argues for greater legislative oversight of administrative activities, but also criticizes existing
structures. Single leaders with responsibility are preferred over appointive boards because sin-
gle leaders are more accountable. Id. But see S. BREYER, supra note 291, at 354-56 (saying
that whether an agency is headed by a multi-member board or a single chief appears irrelevant
to the making of major changes in substantive agency policy at the federal level).
293. Accord, B. DENTE & P. KNOEPFEL, supra note 19, at 185. Predicting the ambient
concentrations associated with emissions from particular sources is not an easy task. See PRO-
JECT SUMMARY, CASE STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF AIR QUALITY MODELING IN ENVI-
RONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING, EPA 600/5481-034, (1981).
294. Presidential Decree Law no. 322 of 1971, art. 11.2, as preserved by Presidential De-
cree Law no. 616 of 1977, art. 102(l).
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C. Regional activity
1. Regional legislation
The legislative provision which made CRIA's regional bodies
also authorized the regions to legislate on their composition and to
broaden their functions to other pollution problems.295  This ex-
tremely lukewarm invitation to regional legislation is symptomatic of
the improper conceptual approach to regionalism within the subject
of air pollution control. Instead of a bland authorization to act, the
decree should have established certain standards in terms of personnel
and technical competence which the regions would be obliged to
achieve in whatever way they saw fit. A simple authorization is an
acquiescence to inertia.
Regional legislation has modified the compositions of CRIA's
and broadened their functions to other kinds of environ-
mental problems.296  Sicily, 297  Toscana, 298  Lazio, 299  Veneto, 30°
Liguria,30 1 Umbria, 30 2 and Emilia-Romagna 30 3 have modified the
compositions of CRIA's or added other kinds of pollution problems
295. Presidential Decree Law no. 616 of 1977, art. 101, final clause. No provisions were
made for their funding.
296. See generally, Lewanski, Nuove tendenze regionali nel settore dell'inquinamento
atmosferico: La recente nornativa dell'Emilia-Romagna, 10 LE REGIONI 53 (1982).
Regional legislation has been published in regional official bulletins, which are not widely
available and on occasion either incomplete or poorly indexed. A recent law requires that
henceforth regional legislation also be published in the national Gazzetta Ufficiale. Law no.
839 of Dec. 11, 1984, art. 3, Gaz. Uff. no. 345 of Dec. 17, 1984. This will make subsequent
regional legislation easier to find.
297. Regional Law no. 39 of Sicilia of June 18, 1977, arts. 3-4, Gaz. Uff. Sicilia no. 27 of
June 21, 1977, modified by Regional Law no. 78 of Sicilia of Aug. 4, 1980, Gaz. Uff. Sicilia no.
36 of Aug. 9, 1980.
298. Regional Law no. 70 of Toscana of Aug. 24, 1982, BU no. 49 of Aug. 31, 1982 (giving
a 19 member committee responsibility for air and noise pollution, but making no provision for
staff).
299. Regional Law no. 50 of Lazio of June 29, 1979, BU no. 19 of July 10, 1979 (estab-
lishes a regional CRIA consisting of eleven members; its technical secretariat consists of em-
ployees in the central office of the regional government).
300. Regional Law no. 28 of Veneto of Apr. 11, 1980, BU no. 23, ediz. straordinaria, of
Apr. 16, 1980.
301. Regional Law no. 20 of Liguria of Mar. 24, 1980, BU no. 14, supp. no. 2, of Apr. 2,
1980. This law makes the regional government responsible for authorizing the content of pol-
lution permits given by mayors. Id. arts. 4(d), 15. The regional government is advised by the
comitato tecnico per l'ambiente, a modified version of the old CRIA. Id. art. 5.
302. Regional Law no. 72 of Umbria of Dec. 10, 1980, BU no. 72 of Dec. 17, 1980 (creates
Consiglio tecnico regionale per la sanita (Regional Technical Council for Health) and assigns
functions of CRIA to it along with other health care duties. The Consiglio has 47 members,
but there is a special section for air pollution consisting of five members of which four are
public officials and one is an industry representative).
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to their jurisdiction. Unfortunately, these reorganizations of the
CRIA's have not generally involved assigning to them a staff which
would prepare individual permit requirements. Instead, the CRIA's
remain excessively large collegial bodies without a particular individ-
ual or specific staff designated as responsible for overseeing permit
applications and ensuring that sensible requirements are imposed.
The regional law of Emilia Romagna 30 4 is typical. Its CRIA is to
consist of the chief regional official for environmental affairs, two re-
gional employees with experience in environmental protection, one
public health expert, two experts in industrial installations, one chem-
ist, one meteorologist, one acoustical expert, one expert from a uni-
versity, three other experts, three experts chosen by the regional
government from a list proposed by management organizations, an
agronomist chosen from a list submitted by a farmers' association, an
expert chosen from a union list, and experts representing local moni-
toring networks. To the extent that other regional bureaucracies are
affected, their representatives may participate. It is difficult to con-
ceive how twenty or more people as part of a collegial body can in any
meaningful way pass on the content of a technical engineering
assessment.
Nevertheless, regional legislation has made some positive contri-
butions. In the early 1970s, 30 5 Lombardia, Emilia Romagna, Tos-
cana, and Puglia funded measuring networks. 30 6 At the beginning of
the eighties, Liguria and Emilia Romagna adopted regional laws ap-
plying the preexisting national air pollution controls to all industrial
installations, whether or not they were located in the larger com-
munes to which the applicability of the 1966 law was limited. 30 7 This
action corrected one of the obvious flaws of the national legislation.
303. Regional Law no. 21 of Emilia-Romagna of Aug. 17, 1981, BU no. 96 of Aug. 18,
1981.
304. Id. art. 4. Sicily's air pollution laws follow a similar pattern. Regional Law no. 39 of
Sicilia of June 18, 1977, arts. 3-4, Gaz. Uff. Sicilia no. 27 of June 21, 1977, modified by Re-
gional Law no. 78 of Sicilia of Aug. 4, 1980, Gaz. UfP. Sicilia no. 36 of Aug. 9, 1980.
305. F. GIAMPIETRO, supra note 261 at 310-12, (collection of some of this information).
306. Regional Law no. 49 of Lombardia of Aug. 23, 1974, BU no. 35, supp., of Aug. 28,
1974; Regional Law no. 19 of Emilia-Romagna of Mar. 24, 1975, BU no. 45 of Mar. 26, 1975;
Regional Law no. 21 of Toscana of May 27, 1974, BU no. 24 of June 5, 1974 (authorization to
take out 800 million lira loan for financing monitoring networks); Regional Law no. 42 of
Puglia of May 21, 1975, BU no. 20, edizione straordinaria, of May 28, 1975. Piedmont pro-
vided for the creation of a monitoring network in 1978. Regional Law no. 52 of Aug. 21, 1978,
BU no. 35 of Aug. 29, 1978 (also adding four members to the CRIA).
307. Regional Law no. 20 of Liguria, arts. 13, 14; Regional Law no. 21 of Emilia-Roma-
gna of Aug. 17, 1981, art. 2.
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Finally, the provinces of Trentino and Bolzano, which as part of the
special statute region of Trentino-Alto Adige benefit from special
guarantees of autonomy, have each established complete air pollution
control programs including generalized emission limits and bureau-
cratic support.
308
In the end the regional legislative activity on air pollution may be
like the bulk of regional legislative activity, which deals with triviali-
ties of administrative organization or with authorizations of particular
expenditures. 30 9 The regional laws just mentioned in fact raise strong
suspicions that they amount to little more than a reshuffling of organi-
zation charts, rather than a real start towards efficient bureaucratic
activity. The CRIA's lack of administrative resources is a lack of fi-
nancing and a lack of technical personnel. The ability of the regions
to resolve the financing problem is limited because most of the re-
gions' budgets comes from precommitted state transfers. 310 This is
true despite the constitutional intent that the regions have financial as
well as political autonomy. 311 To remedy the financial problem,
either the magnitude of unconstrained regional funds will have to be
increased, or alternatively, some initiative at the central level to guide
308. Trentino created the Dipartimento Ecologico Provinciale by the provincial Law no.
59 of Nov. 29, 1973, BU no. 53 of Dec. 11, 1973, and then by the provincial Law no. 47 of
Nov. 18, 1978, BU no. 60, suppl. ord. no. 1, of Nov. 28, 1978, established emission limits for
all stationary sources and a Servizio di Protezione dell'Ambiente (Agency for the Protection of
the Environment) to apply them. This service, which has responsibility for water pollution as
well as air pollution, is to undertake monitoring activity and maintain an inventory of pollu-
tion sources. A commission of six technicians and public officials is to direct the service's
activities with respect to air pollution. The provincial legislation was updated without chang-
ing its basic orientation by laws no. 18 of June 20, 1980, BU no. 33 of June 24, 1980 (updating
the emission limits and altering the composition of the dipartimento ecologico provinciale) and
no. 1 of Jan. 11, 1982, BU no. 4 of Jan. 19, 1982 (making technical adjustments); see also
decree of the president of the provincial government of Trento no. 6-68 of Feb. 22, 1982, BU
no. 16 of Apr. 13, 1982 (implementing regulations).
The laws for Bolzano are provincial Law no. 13 of June 4, 1973, BU no. 7 of Feb. 6, 1973,
modified by provincial Law no. 46 of Sept. 13, 1973, BU no. 45 of Oct. 16, 1973.
309. See Bartole, I1 caso italiano, 1984 LE REGIONI 411, 418, stating that:
La qualita della legislazione regionale non e molto alta e si tratta spesso di leggine
concernenti minuti aspetti dell'amministrazione regionale, o di leggi di spesa, le quali
in ogni caso sono state le grande risorse dei legislatori locali in difetto di iniziative piu
impegnative di riordino delle materie regionali. (The quality of regional legislation is
not very high, and often it consists of little laws concerning miniscule aspects of
regional administration, or of appropriation laws, which in any event have been the
great refuge of local legislators in the absence of more substantial initiatives directed
towards reordering regional matters.)
Id.
310. Id. at 423.
311. CosT. art. 119.
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funds into the CRIA's will be required. Such an initiative could be in
the context of a framework law requiring the development of a certain
level of regional bureaucratic proficiency in the issuance and nonissu-
ance of permits relating to pollution. Such a law could also treat the
problem of technical personnel. Still, the personnel problem is ulti-
mately a regional one because the central authorities are completely
lacking both in the resources to enforce standards directly and in the
ability to recruit qualified technicians.
2. A sampling of regional bureaucratic activity
Italian central government administrative officials do not have a
good grasp of what the regions have actually done from a practical, as
opposed to a legislative, point of view with respect to air pollution
control.312 The one empirical study undertaken of regional adminis-
trative activity in the field of air pollution control3 13 reveals that re-
gions have adopted significantly different strategies of activity and
that the effective central establishment of minimum standards of ac-
tivity would prove useful.
The three regions studied were Emilia Romagna, Lombardia,
and Piemonte. This study found that the central government was ab-
sent from air pollution control activity. 314 The governmental levels
active were the communes and the regions. During the late 1970's,
the CRIA's of these three regions had staffs of nine, twenty two, and
three functionaries, respectively. The professional background of the
nine Emilia Romagna functionaries was predominantly meteorology,
and Emilia Romagna gave priority in its administrative activity to the
establishment of monitoring networks. In Lombardia, where the
dominant professional background of the staff was engineering, prior-
ity was given to control of emissions. In Piemonte, with its small
staff, there was little activity. Of nine communes investigated in these
three regions, four (Torino, Piacenza, Bologna, and Sesto San Gio-
vanni) spontaneously created bureaucratic structures of from one to
eighteen people to engage in air pollution control activity.
In light of the study's finding that efforts to control industrial air
pollution emissions have been largely ineffective, 315 the question of
312. Author's personal conversations with Italian officials. This situation may change as a
result of the law creating the Ministry of Environment. For text, see report of Senate session
of May 8, 1986.
313. See B. DENTE & P. KNOEPFEL, supra note 19; B. DENrE, supra note 6.
314. The conclusions of the study are summarized in B. DENTE, supra note 6 at 191-95.
315. B. DENTE & P. KNOEPFEL, supra note 19 at 165.
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why these regional and municipal efforts are insufficient must be ad-
dressed. The insufficiency of local efforts, together with the extreme
variance in the level of regional efforts, supports the need to have
stronger central intervention to ensure a minimum level of regional
activity. On the local level, the study found that even though Torino
had a staff of eighteen, far above that of other cities,316 it did not have
sufficient power to strongly regulate local industry. 317 Further, To-
rino was unable to amass sufficient expertise to confront the technical
questions involved.
318
With respect to the three regions studied, only Lombardia ap-
pears to have undertaken significant substantive activity. The study
characterizes Emilia Romagna's monitoring activity as having largely
symbolic rather than substantive value.319 Although the regions have
neither acted effectively to manage the air pollution problem nor pro-
voked central intervention to strengthen their position, it would ap-
pear that they are beginning to recognize the inadequacy of the status
quo. An effort by the regions themselves to agree on emission stan-
dards320 demonstrates their desire for some form of uniform mini-
mum standards.
3. Italian regionalism and Community law
Under the presidential decree law no. 616 of 1977,321 the basis for
regional application of EEC directives is to be the national law adopt-
ing the directive into domestic law. The model adopted was the na-
tional framework laws which ought to have regulated regional activity
within the fields constitutionally assigned to the regions.
One difficulty with this scheme is that quite frequently the Italian
Parliament has not received a directive into national law, let alone
identified regional responsibilities for the directive's implementation,
within a reasonable time. The kind of crisis measures adopted to in-
316. See id. at 128.
317. For example, it was evidently agreed in 1966 in a meeting between the mayor of
Torino and the head of Fiat, the leading local industry, that the comune would not in any way
interfere with Fiat with respect to air pollution. B. DENTE & P. KNOEPFEL, supra note 19 at
138-39.
318. Id. at 179-80.
319. Id. at 161-62.
320. Id. at 121.
321. Presidential Decree Law no. 616 of 1977, art. 6, implementing the delegation of Law
no. 382 of July 22, 1975, art. 1(5), Gaz. Uff. no. 220 of Aug. 20, 1975.
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corporate directives into national law are evidence of this. 322
Article 6 of the presidential decree Law no. 616 of 1977 expressly
grants the central government the power to substitute itself for the
regions if they do not implement Community law. The Constitutional
Court has found this approach acceptable on the ground that the
State has exclusive responsibility to ensure that international obliga-
tions are respected. In the Constitutional Court's view, implementa-
tion of Community law is an obligation deriving from adherence to
the Community treaties and therefore a state responsibility which
takes precedence over regional autonomy. 323 This precedence applies
even to the special statute regions which otherwise benefit from spe-
cial guarantees of autonomy under article 116 of the Constitution.324
If Community law were not involved, national central authorities
might not have constitutional power to substitute themselves for local
authorities in the face of local inaction. The power is potentially im-
portant, but pessimism about the prospects for its meaningful exercise
is justified. 325 So far the central administration has not effectively in-
tervened directly at the regional level, and there is no reason that the
mere involvement of Community obligations would make a decisive
difference.
D. Conclusion
In summary, under the present statutory system the central gov-
ernment of Italy has only minimal powers to regulate regional action
and virtually no power to overcome regional and local inertia.
Although the central government has the power to set minimum
emission standards, it has never exercised it. Only in the area of air
quality standards have the central authorities established minimum
requirements to which the regional actions must conform. Although
a step in the right direction, these standards establish only a formal
minimum. To ensure that they are respected, the central government
needs to establish emission standards for at least some categories of
sources.
Moreover, with respect to the regions, the central government
322. Bassanini & Caretti, Autonomie regionali e poteri comunitari, 8 LE REGIONI 84, 101-
02 (1980).
323. Judgment no. 182 of July 22, 1976, Corte cost., 47 Rac. Uff. 587, 596-97, 21 Giur.
cost. 1138, 1145-46 (1976).
324. Judgment no. 86 of July 26, 1979, Corte cost., 53 Rac. Uff. 43, 48-49, 24 Giur. cost.
646, 650-51 (1979).
325. See B. DENTE & P. KNOEPFEL, supra note 19 at 204.
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needs an effective power of substitution analogous to that of the
United States EPA to substitute itself for states which are not ade-
quately enforcing air pollution control limitations. Whether it will be
possible for the Ministry of Environment, in reliance on the 1986 stat-
ute creating it, to have powers approximating the EPA is questiona-
ble. The lack of administrative resources and the absence of
requirements that regional action plans be developed and presented to
the ministry for approval undermine such power. In this vein, finan-
cial initiatives aimed at increasing the capacity of the regional bureau-
cracy devoted to air pollution control would be helpful. A
concomitant approach would be to centrally require regional develop-
ment of effective bureaucracies with the threat of central substitution
if they are not developed.
Whatever tools are adopted as incentives for reforming the re-
gional bureaucracies, the regional authorities with permitting respon-
sibility need to be converted from interdisciplinary study seminars
into true bureaucratic permitting organizations. Given that the initial
central legislation favored the collegial decision-making approach on
the mistaken theory that a variety of public officials would among
themselves have the expertise to set air pollution permit requirements
and out of a desire to avoid altering the balance of political influences
over the administrative process,3 26 a sufficiently bold central legisla-
tive reform in Italy seems unlikely.
Judicial activism and a sympathetic judicial reception of private
damage actions may alleviate the inadequacies of the public adminis-
tration.3 27 Nevertheless, European Community legislation may offer
greater prospects for reforming the structure of relations between lo-
cal and central authorities.
VI. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
European Community air pollution law is an integral part of
French and Italian law.328 As already noted, Community air pollu-
tion law has not had any effect on the structure of the relationship
326. Id. at 184.
327. See Del Duca, supra note 9, at 374.
328. The European Court of Justice declared the supremacy of Community law in 1964.
Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 ECR 585. In the early 1970s it asserted that EEC law has
supremacy even over national constitutional law. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft mbH v. fuhrund Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 ECR 1125, 1134;
case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 ECR 491, 507-08. The constitutional courts of Ger-
many and Italy have had reservations about accepting Community supremacy with respect to
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between central and local authorities in France because of the strong
centralization there. In contrast, Community law has the potential to
provide the impetus for centralization currently lacking in Italy's re-
gional system.
Community environmental policy was initiated by the declara-
tion of the member states' heads of state and government at the Paris
summit in 1972.329 Following this political consensus of 1972, the
Commission developed an environmental action program to guide
Community action. The Council of Ministers adopted it in 1973.330
Two other plans have followed it.331
Articles 100 and 235 of the EEC treaty (Treaty of Rome) have
been the legal foundation of the Community's environmental pol-
icy. 332 The so-called Single European Act 333 amended the Treaty of
constitutional law, but with respect to ordinary law, the doctrine is not seriously questioned.
See Hartley, supra note 165, at 224-46.
Article 177 of the EEC treaty establishes a procedure for a national court to refer a ques-
tion of Community law to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. This reference is
obligatory for courts against which no judicial remedy is available under national law, i.e.,
courts of last resort. Through this procedure, barring uncooperativeness by national courts,
the Court of Justice is the ultimate arbiter of Community law.
329. See Beraud, Fondements juridiques du droit de l'environnement dans le traite de
Rome, 22 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 35, 36-37 (1979); Moussis, Le cadrejuridique de la
politique d'environnement, 26 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 67 (1983).
330. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1 (1973). The first action program established
objectives and principles of EEC environmental policy and set priorities for a two year period.
General principles of EEC environmental policy established by the first action program in-
clude recognition of the need for preventive action, that action should be at the appropriate
level of government, and the responsibility of the polluter. Id. at 6-7. The polluter pays princi-
ple advanced by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) is
accepted with the qualifications that special arrangements and transition periods may be per-
missible. Id. at 6. For exposition of the polluter pays principle and its consequences, see
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE POLLUTER PAYS
PRINCIPLE: DEFINITION, ANALYSIS, IMPLEMENTATION (1975).
Lead, sulfur compounds, particulates, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and hydrocar-
bons among others were identified as pollutants to which priority was to be given in establish-
ing criteria of harm and standardized measurement methods. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
112) 1, 8, 13 (1973). Water pollutants were however to be accorded priority for standard
setting, although harmonization of vehicle specifications was also a priority. Id at 9.
331. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 139) 1 (1977) (second action plan); 26 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 46) 1 (1983) (third action plan). The third action program anticipates continued Com-
munity efforts toward establishment of air quality standards. Id. at 10. It also anticipates
establishment of emission standards "for certain sources." Id. It specifies that "[t]his would
apply notably to large, fixed sources with high stacks which distribute pollutants over a wide
radius." Id. Motor vehicles are to be a continuing concern. Id. Implementation of the direc-
tive establishing ambient air quality limits for sulfur dioxide and particulates, 23 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 229) 30 (1980), is singled out as an important activity. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 46) 1, 2 (1983).
332. For an analysis of how various articles of the EEC Treaty might be used for environ-
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Rome in a number of ways, including making more explicit its provi-
sion for a Community environmental policy. The Act was signed in
February 1986 by representatives of all the member states, and has
been ratified by each of the member states pursuant to Article 236 of
the EEC Treaty. Because the Act has just come into force, the princi-
pal Community environmental legislation was adopted based upon ar-
ticles 100 and 235.
Article 100 authorizes Community policy in fields involving the
harmonization of laws, regulations, and administrative action affect-
ing the establishment and functioning of the common market. 334 For
example, the early Community legislation regulating motor vehicle
emissions was based exclusively on article 100.335 The Court of Jus-
tice, in a pair of cases condemning Italy for tardy implementation of
directives on detergents and on sulfur content of fuel oil, has held that
article 100 may be used as a basis for Community environmental leg-
islation.336 Because of the need to show effects on competition, article
100 alone might have been insufficient to motivate all Community en-
vironmental protection measures. Some of these measures seem to be
much more directed to treating substantive environmental problems
rather than to the goal of achieving uniform laws. For this reason
article 235 has been a useful supplement to article 100.
Although article 189 of the EEC treaty limits Community insti-
tutions to the exercise of enumerated powers only, article 235 pro-
vides that by unanimous Council action additional powers may be
exercised to achieve a Community objective. Article 2 of the Treaty
provides that it is a Community objective "to promote throughout the
mental protection, see E. GRABITZ & C. SASSE, COMPETENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: PROPOSAL FOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE TREATY OF
ROME 24-31 (1977).
333. 19 BULL. EC(2) 7-10 (1986).
334. Limits to reliance on article 100 are that at least one member state must have some
provisions in the field and that the national provisions must directly affect the establishment or
functioning of the common market. Articles 101 and 102 concerning actual and potential
distortions of competition could also in principle be relied on. However, distortion of competi-
tion is a difficult concept to define, and before a directive is issued, the Commission must
consult the state involved.
335. Directive 70/157/EEC of Feb. 6, 1970, 3 O.J. EUR. COMM. (special English ed.) (No.
L 42 at 16) 111 (1970); directive 70/220/EEC of 20 March 1970, 3 O.J. EUR. COMM. (special
English ed.) (No. L 76 at 1) 171 (1970) (specifically referring to the need to preempt French
and German regulations of vehicle emissions in order to avoid impediments to the functioning
of the common market).
336. EEC Commission v. Italy (Detergents), 1980 ECR 1099, 1106; EEC Commission v.
Italy (maximum sulphur content of liquid fuels), 1980 ECR 1115, 1122.
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Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a con-
tinuous and balanced expansion." When the Council approved the
first environmental action program in 1973, it determined that this
language included environmental protection. 337 Although the Court
of Justice has not had occasion to rule on this point, it is now gener-
ally accepted that protection of health and the environment and
sound management of natural resources are valid motivations for
Community policy.
3 38
The principal legal acts authorized by article 189 are Community
directives and regulations. Both are to be proposed by the Commis-
sion and approved by the Council. Regulations are meant to apply to
member states and individuals without the need for further adminis-
trative or legislative elaboration. Directives ordinarily require na-
tional administrative and legislative implementation. The goals
contained in them are binding, but member states have discretion in
how to achieve those goals.
The total number of directives of all kinds in force has grown
from less than twenty-eight prior to 1970, to more than seven hun-
dred in 1980.339 Seventy pieces of Community environmental legisla-
tion, principally in the form of directives, were enacted between 1973
and 1982.340 Implementation of directives in national law and prac-
tice is a major problem.34 1 There has been a natural tendency for the
Commission to focus on formal compliance with a directive, i.e.
337. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1, 5 (1973).
338. See Third Environmental Action Program, point 9, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46)
1, 5 (1983) ("The ultimate objectives of environment policy are the protection of human
health, the long-term availability of all the resources which determine the quality of life, of
adequate quality and in sufficient quantity, namely, water, air, space-from both the land-use
and landscape points of view--climate, raw materials, the built environment, and the natural
and cultural heritage, as well as the maintenance and, where possible, the restoration of the
natural environment with suitable habitats for flora and fauna."); id. point 15 at 8 ("It is first
of all essential to combat the deterioration of the environment by reducing pollution and nui-
sances, in order to develop sound management of natural resources and to protect human
beings.").
339. J. WEILER, SUPRANATIONAL LAW AND THE SUPRANATIONAL SYSTEM: LEGAL
STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Doctoral thesis de-
fended at the European University Institute, June 1982, at 420 (revised version published as IL
SISTEMA COMUNITARIO EUROPEO (1985)). Weiler's figure of only 28 directives in force in
1970 comes from R. PRYCE, THE POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 59 (1973).
340. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY'S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (2d ed. 1984), European Documentation
Series no. 1/1984. For a systematic listing of Community environmental legislation with brief
summaries of content, see P. BIANCHI & G. CORDINI, COMUNITA EUROPEA E PROTEZIONE
DELL'AMBIENTE (1983).
341. See von Moltke & Haigh, Major Issues for 1981, 7 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 23, 28, 30 (1981).
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whether a member state has enacted laws receiving the directive into
national law. It is generally difficult to find empirical data of any kind
on member states' compliance with the substance of the directives.3 42
The most readily available information regards the proceedings
against member states instituted by the Commission before the Court
of Justice for infractions of directives. 343 But again, these proceedings
regard formal compliance, not actual implementation. Because of the
diversity in member state legal and administrative systems, compara-
tive studies of compliance are complex. The Commission is reluctant
to release its information because of the political sensitivity of non-
compliance. Compliance varies from member state to member state.
For example, Italy has been condemned forty six times by the Court
of Justice for noncompliance with directives; whereas, the next most
often condemned countries, France and Belgium, were each only con-
demned seven times. 344 Factors affecting national compliance with
directives include the institutional mechanisms for implementing di-
rectives in national law, the stability of national governments, and the
efficiency of national public administrations. 345
A. Overview of EEC Air Pollution Law
Community air pollution legislation regulates vehicle emis-
sions, 34 6 ambient concentrations of sulfur dioxide and particulates,
347
342. Two of the few documents dealing with the reality of environmental policy imple-
mentation are: COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENES L'ETAT DE L' ENVIRONNE-
MENT: DEUXIEME RAPPORT 1979 (1979); COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE
COUNCIL, PROGRESS MADE IN IMPLEMENTING THE ENVIRONMENT ACTION PROGRAMME
AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE WORK DONE TO IMPLEMENT IT (1980) COM(80)222.
343. For recent statistics, see Azzi, L'Application du droit communautaire dans les etats
membres: Une vue d'ensemble, 1985 REVUE FRANCAISE D'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 191.
344. J. WEILER, supra note 339 at 458.
345. See Azzi, supra note 343 at 194-208.
346. Directive 70/156/EEC of Feb. 6, 1970, 3 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 42 at 1) (Special
English ed.) 96 (1970), as amended by Act of Accession (1972), 15 O.J. COMM. EUR. (No. L
73) 1, 115 (1972) (English translation in Treaties establishing the European Communities;
Treaties amending these Treaties, Documents concerning the Accession 1171-72 (1973)); and
Act of Accession (1979), 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 1, 108 (1979); Directive 70/220/
EEC of Mar. 20, 1970, 3 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 76 at 1) (Special English ed.) 171 (1970);
Directive 72/306/EEC of Aug. 2, 1972, 5 O.J. EUR. COMM. (Special English ed.) (No. L 190
at 1) 889 (1972); Directive 74/290/EEC of May 28, 1974, 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 159) 61
(1974); Directive 77/102/EEC of 30 Nov. 1976, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 32) 32 (1977);
Directive 78/665 of July 14, 1978, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 223) 48 (1978); Directive 83/
351/EEC of June 16, 1983, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 197) 1 (1983).
Negotiations for an agreement to further stiffen the standards are underway. See 18
BULL. EC (11) 60 point 2.11.112 (Jan. 1986); 18 BULL. EC (6) 5859 point 2.1.97 (Aug. 1985);
18 BULL. EC (3) 36 point 2.1.70 (June 1985). Two directives on diesel vehicles have been
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ambient concentrations of lead, 34 8 ambient concentrations of nitrogen
oxides,349 and emissions from industrial plants. 350 It also sets stan-
dards for lead in gasoline 351 and sulfur in fuel oil.352 The Commission
has proposed legislation to limit emissions from large combustion
plants, which include coal and oil power plants. 353
B. The Ambient Air Quality Directives
The 1980 directive establishing minimum ambient air quality
standards for sulfur dioxide and particulates was a fundamental devel-
opment in Community policy. 354 The directive established "limit val-
ues" and "guide values." Limit values are to protect human health
specifically. 355 Guide values are long term precautions for health and
environment. 35 6 Values are established for sulfur dioxide in conjunc-
tion with particulates and for particulates separately. Before October
1982 member states were to submit to the Commission plans to bring
into compliance by 1993 any regions which will exceed the values es-
tablished by the directive after April 1, 1983. 357 All implementation
measures must be reported to the Commission, 358 and states must es-
tablish monitoring networks and report violations of the standards.
359
proposed: 29 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 174) (1986) (private vehicles); 29 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 193) (1986) (commercial vehicles).
347. Directive 80/779/EEC of July 15, 1980, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229) 30 (1980).
348. Council directive 82/884/EEC of Dec. 3, 1982, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 378) 15
(1982).
349. Directive of Mar. 7, 1985, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 87) 1 (1985).
350. Directive 84/360/EEC of June 28, 1984, 27 0.3. EUR. COMM. (No. L 188) 20 (1984).
351. Directive 78/611/EEC of June 29, 1978, 21 0.3. EUR. COMM. (No. L 197) 19 (1978).
352. Directive 75/716/EEC of Nov. 24, 1975, 18 0.3. EUR. COMM. (No. L 307) 23 (1975).
A reinforcement of the standards set by this directive has been proposed. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 205) 3 (1985).
353. Proposed directive of Sept. 13, 1983, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 258) 3 (1983);
Proposed directive of Dec. 19, 1983, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 49) 1 (1984). Deliberations
on this directive are continuing. See 19 BULL. EC (6) 58 points 2.1.155-56 (Sept. 1986); 19
BULL. EC (3) 39-40 point 2.1.107 (1986).
354. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229) 30 (1980).
355. Id. art. 2.
356. Id.
357. Id. art. 3.
358. Id. art. 15.
359. Id. arts. 6-7. The first Council action specifically directed toward sulfur dioxide and
particulates was to provide for exchange of information between surveillance and monitoring
networks for sulfur dioxide and particulates. Council decision 75/441/EEC of June 24, 1975,
18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194) 32 (1975). The 1975 decision has been updated by decision
82/459/EEC of June 24, 1982, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) 1 (1982) (monitoring pro-
gram and information exchange for sulfur dioxide, suspended particulates, suspended particles
of heavy metals, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and ozone). The article 5 preference of
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The directive established alternative measurement techniques and
permits use of other techniques if proved to produce equivalent re-
suits. 360 Finally, the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions
necessary to implement the directive were to be brought into force
within two years of the directive's effective date. 361 As of 1985, the
Commission termed the progress made in implementing this directive
as "anything but satisfactory.
'3 62
The directive on lead fixes limit values for concentrations of lead
in the air, but permits member states to have more stringent require-
ments.3 63 Member states had five years to comply with the directive's
limit values, and were to submit plans to the Commission explaining
how they will comply. 3
The recent directive on nitrogen oxides fixes limit values which
are not to be exceeded and guide values, which if exceeded, are to
promote special attention by member states.3 65 To attain the limit
values in areas where they are exceeded "as rapidly as possible and by
1 January 1994 at the latest," plans are to be submitted to the Com-
mission.366 Member states may set more stringent values. 367
C. Emission Standards
The recent directive on air pollution from industrial plants,
adopted four years after the sulfur dioxide and particulate directive,
has increased the likelihood of successfully attaining ambient air qual-
ity goals.3 68 It does so chiefly by making Community emission stan-
dards for industrial sources a more realistic possibility.
The directive has two operative requirements. One is that mem-
ber states require air pollution permits for industrial plants within cat-
egories listed by the directive which are authorized or modified after
1987.369 The second is that these permits may be issued only when
this decision for member state transmission of data to the Commission on magnetic tape evi-
dences an increased sophistication towards the practical problems of air pollution control.
360. 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229) 30 (1980).
361. Id. art. 15.
362. 4 Common Mkt. Rptr. 11,649 (1985); see also 18 BULL. EC (7/8) 56 point 2.1.121
(Oct. 1985).
363. 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229) 30, art. 2(3) (1980).
364. Id. art. 3.
365. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 87) 1, art. 2 (1985).
366. Id. art. 3.
367. Id. art. 4.
368. 27 O. EUR. COMM. (No. L 188) 20 (1984).
369. Id. art. 3.
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the national permitting authority is satisfied that:
1. all appropriate preventive measures against air pollution have
been taken, including the application of the best available technol-
ogy, provided that the application of such measures does not entail
excessive costs;
2. the use of plant will not cause significant air pollution particu-
larly from the emission of substances referred to in Annex II;
3. none of the emission limit values applicable will be exceeded;
4. all the air quality limit values applicable will be taken into
account.
370
The first two provisos merely require national authorities to im-
pose reasonable conditions. The last condition emphasizes the preex-
isting requirements of the ambient air quality directives. The third is
the potentially useful innovation. The emission limit values to which
it refers are provided elsewhere in the directive. Specifically, the di-
rective provides that the Council, acting unanimously on proposition
of the Commission, may set not only measurement methods, but also
emission limits for categories of industry. 371 Thus far, none have been
established.
Establishment of these emission limitations will help overcome
the inherent weakness of the ambient air quality directives in two
ways. First, precise emission limitations will significantly restrict the
practically unbounded discretion which member states currently en-
joy in the translation of the general ambient air quality standards into
emission limits for specific sources. Second, the emission limitations
should compensate for the Commission's incapacity to intervene di-
rectly in member state administrative efforts. The emission limita-
tions will be precise numerical limits. Either the limitations or the
control technology which corresponds to them will be required in per-
mits for new or modified installations. If a national permitting au-
thority issues a permit without meeting these conditions, it will be
violating Community law. It should therefore be conceivable for
someone with standing, for example, a neighbor or an environmental
group, to invoke the jurisdiction of the appropriate national court to
invalidate a defective permit.
A proposed directive for large combustion plants, including fossil
fuel electric power plants, large industrial boilers, and spaceheating
plants, would adopt the approach of focusing on emission limitations
370. Id. art. 4.
371. Id. art. 8.
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by sector.372 Over a ten year period the directive would require mem-
ber states to reduce emissions from these sources by 60% for sulfur
dioxide, 40% for dust, and 40% for nitrogen oxides.373 Member
states are to devise plans to achieve these reductions.374 In addition,
national licenses would have to contain emission limitations specified
by the directive for sulfur dioxide, dust, and nitrogen oxides.375
VII. CONCLUSION
In the United States, air pollution control became serious
through the development of a federal bureaucracy capable of effec-
tively requiring each state to either take action itself or be preempted
by direct federal action. Prior efforts of a limited number of individ-
ual states, together with growing public consciousness of air pollution,
triggered this development. The federally mandated state bureaucra-
cies, although expressing a diversity of forms and retaining substantial
autonomy, must satisfy federally imposed minimum standards of ac-
tivity or be displaced by the federal bureaucracy. Under this system,
far more has been accomplished than under the previous regime of
federal inaction. The federal commitment to compel local action
largely overcomes the political externality problems which tend to
lead to local inertia with respect to air pollution control. Nonetheless,
there continues to be meaningful exercise of state autonomy.
France's tradition of centralization dates at least from Napole-
onic times. The centralization of its air pollution control efforts to-
gether with the technocratic approach characteristic of the French
public administration led to neglect of the value of local autonomy.
With the arrival of the socialists to power in 1981, local autonomy
first became a legislatively approved policy, although it has yet to be
extended to air pollution control.
The interest of examining the actual French policy of centralized
air pollution control is twofold. First, it shows a real situation in
which excessive centralization raises significant problems of political
legitimacy. Second, despite the lack of local political autonomy, the
relation between central bureaucrats and peripheral level bureaucrats
of the central administration furnishes a further illustration of the
372. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 258) 3 (1983).
373. Id. art. 3(2).
374. Id. art. 3(l).
375. Id. art. 4(1).
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merit of a system whereby central authorities are capable of imposing
strong minimum levels of action.
Italy is a regional state in which primary responsibility for air
pollution control has been shifted to the regions without any serious
central effort to ensure a minimum of uniformity or of regional activ-
ity. There is substantial dissatisfaction with the results obtained.
Whether the new, statutorily granted powers of the Ministry of Envi-
ronment to substitute itself for inactive local authorities will be effec-
tively exercised remains to be seen. The possibilities of relying on
European Community law to supply the central impetus lacking at
the national level in Italy further demonstrate the value of federalism.
Federalism, centralism, and regionalism might seem to be exper-
iences too diverse to yield meaningful comparative results. In fact,
the comparison yields useful results.
The French and United States air pollution control policies pro-
vide for local administration, but leave the central level ample powers
to fix minimum standards and to impel local action. The French pol-
icy, although effective, suffers from legitimacy problems because of
the remoteness of local bureaucratic authorities from democratic con-
trol. In Italy, the central level has not had a real power to impel
action by the regional bodies which directly administer air pollution
control. However, the development of European Community norms
combined with effective exercise of the Ministry of Environment's
new powers of substitution and continued judicial intervention could
compensate for the lack of national central direction.
From a policy perspective, the comparative investigation of de-
centralization has provided useful results for each system. The rec-
ommendation for the United States is to retain the basic structure of
federal-state relations of its present policy. For France, it is to adapt
the ongoing decentralization policy to air pollution control in a way
that maintains the present advantages of central impulsion. For Italy,
which is engaged in the first stages of a review of its air pollution
legislation due to the prompting of Community legislation, the recom-
mendation is to achieve a greater central capacity to require regional
action. In the absence of this improvement, judicial activism and
Community legislation may serve to help fill the gap.
Extending the analysis of local and central relations from the na-
tional level in the case of France and Italy to include the European
Community introduces a new level of complexity. The supranational-
ism of the European Community is not comparable to the federalism
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of the United States or the regionalism of Italy. The members of the
Community remain sovereign states, and for the foreseeable future the
Community will have no executive or administrative authority capa-
ble of supplanting national administrative and legislative actors who
fail to implement Community policies. This is especially true for poli-
cies like the Community's environmental policy, the implementation
of which may require extensive reform of national legislation and the
development of new national bureaucratic structures.
Nonetheless, the very success of the European Community facili-
tates the ability of polluting activity to move across borders in the
quest for pollution havens. Accordingly, the political externality con-
siderations discussed with regard to the United States, France, and
Italy also apply at the Community level. The Community's extensive
environmental legislation is undoubtedly motivated in part by such
considerations. The challenge facing the Community is to elaborate
its policies in the ways most likely to compensate for the lack of Com-
munity executive and administrative ability. The recent openness to
Community air pollution emission standards is probably a productive
step in this direction.
There is no easy solution to the problem of air pollution, and the
distribution of responsibility between central and local levels of gov-
ernment discussed here is only one of the many issues to be consid-
ered in developing an air pollution control program. Comparison of
the United States, French, and Italian experiences does, however,
show the significant effect which this distribution of responsibility has
on the substance of control efforts. The comparison also illustrates
the general importance of structural issues. Thus, this study of cen-
tral and local responsibilities should prove of interest to those con-
cerned with issues ranging from the merit of economic incentive
approaches versus command and control regulation to the relative
roles of the judiciary and the public administration.
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